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I. INTRODUCTION: CHANNEL SURFING USA
It's been a tough day. I've spent most of it worrying about the Free
Speech Principle. Or at least, the Free Speech Principle described in Cass
Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,' a book by an author
I greatly admire. According to Sunstein, the primary purpose behind free
speech is promoting democratic deliberation about issues of public policy.2
Hence he divides speech into higher and lower tiers of protection. Speech most
worthy of government protection is concerned with deliberation about public
issues; the rest is subject to varying degrees of government regulation.3 It is
a thesis with a considerable historical pedigree. Alexander Meiklejohn made
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a similar claim in the 1940's.4 Moreover, like Meiklejohn, Sunstein
emphasizes that the scope of individual rights should consciously be shaped
in order to promote the goals of democratic deliberation. Conversely, we
should be less concerned about regulation of other types of speech-for
example, advertising and pornography-because they do not contribute to
democratic deliberation.
I have been worrying about this thesis all day. Now I am driving home on
1-95. I say it's been a tough day, but in fact, I realize that I have it pretty easy.
I spend most of my life reading interesting books and articles and talking to
other people about what I have read. Because I teach law, it's my job to be
informed about "public affairs." But I recognize that most other people in this
country have different sorts of jobs. They cook, clean, assemble objects,
answer phones, file papers, care for children. They have hard days too, harder
than I do. And, in most cases, their jobs do not require (or even permit) them
to spend much time working with "public issues."
I travel over the Quinnipiac bridge to Branford, Connecticut. Usually there
is a lot of traffic; it takes about twenty-five minutes on a good day. When I'm
in the car, I usually listen to FM radio; AM is full of talk radio-right-wing
talk shows like Rush Limbaugh, or "shock jocks" like Howard Stemn-which
many people are quite devoted to. At least they let folks sound off a bit. I
wonder if political theorists who emphasize dialogue had talk radio in mind.
(Live from New York, it's the Jtirgen Habermas show! Three hours of
unconstrained dialogue under ideal social conditions with your wild and
rational host, Jtirgen Habermas!)
There is also public radio, which is supported by public grants and listener
contributions, but most people listen to popular music on stations supported by
commercial advertising. There are lots of news reports on public radio-too
many at the end of a long day. Often I simply pop a cassette in my car stereo.
On those days I never listen to the radio at all.
I turn up the volume and think about Sunstein's book.
[['o succeed at all, the system [of democratic deliberation] ... must
reflect broad and deep attention to public issues .... [S]erious issues
must be covered, and they must be covered in a serious way. Indeed,
the mere availability of such coverage may not be enough if few
citizens take advantage of it, and if most viewers and readers are
content with programming and news accounts that do not deal well or
in depth with public issues.6
4. ALEXANDER MEIKLE.JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
reprinted in POLITICAL FREEDOM 3 (1960) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM].
5. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 123, 127, 159-65.
6. Id. at 20.
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When I get home it is usually a little before 7:00 p.m. I am tired. I say
hello to my wife. I sit on the couch and turn on the television. Our house was
built in 1971. It has an "open" floor plan--there is no wall separating the
kitchen and family room. Apparently this was a popular architectural style at
the time the house was built; it is still popular to this day, although now
people add cathedral ceilings and whatnot (giving it that authentic midwestern
gothic look). One of the advantages of the open floor plan is that you can
watch the kids in the family room if you are working in the kitchen. The other
great advantage is that you can watch the television.
Margret and I sit on the sofa and eat our dinner and watch the tube. We
flip through the channels determinedly. We are couch potatoes. Sofa spuds. We
are on a mission from God. We are looking for entertainment.
What people now prefer and believe may be a product of insufficient
information, limited opportunities, legal constraints, or unjust
background conditions. People may think as they do simply because
they have not been provided with sufficient information and
opportunities. It is not paternalistic, or an illegitimate interference with
competing conceptions of the good, for a democracy to promote
scrutiny and testing of preferences and beliefs through deliberative
processes.
7
Our cable company offers over seventy channels. About 7:00 p.m. there
are mostly sitcoms, game shows, and tabloid TV. The FCC decided to strike
a blow for programming diversity by effectively forbidding the major network
affiliates to program network-produced shows before 8:00 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time.8 The major result of this regulation is that the independent
stations (and Fox) fill the time with reruns of previous network shows. This
means I get to see all the episodes of Roseanne I missed over the years.
Generally speaking these are shows that appealed to a broad enough segment
of the public taste that they have survived long enough to go into syndication.
So much for diversity. Meanwhile local network affiliates fill the time with
game shows like Wheel of Fortune and tabloid shows like Hard Copy and
Inside Edition. So much for attention to serious issues. One station has started
showing reruns of The Simpsons. I am delighted. Nothing like good, cynical
humor that undermines everything honorable about American life.
7. Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
8. See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulatioans with Respect to Competition
and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382. 384 (1970)
(describing and promulgating "Prime Time Access Rule" (PTAR). codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k)
(1993)). By its own terms, the PTAR's prohibition applies only to network affiliates in the top 50 markets.
but this effectively makes uniform network programming for the remainder unprofitable. On the PTAR.
see THOMAS G. KRATENMAKER & LUCAS A. Powa, JR., REGuLATING BROADCAST PRoGRAsLMttNG 72-74.
99-100 (1994).
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It may seem controversial or strange to say that there is a problem
for the Madisonian system if people do not seek serious coverage of
serious issues. Perhaps this suggestion is unacceptably paternalistic;
perhaps we should take people however we find them. But as I have
noted, the system of deliberative democracy is not supposed simply
to implement existing desires. Its far more ambitious goal is to create
the preconditions for a well-functioning democratic process.9
During the commercials we flip through the channels. We move from The
Simpsons to the Simpsons-from Homer and Marge to O.J. and Nicole Brown.
The World Tonight is just ending on CNN. The big story of the day is (as
usual) the O.J. Simpson case. At 7:00 p.m. there is Hard Copy, followed by
Inside Edition. They are tabloid journalism, mostly about Prince Charles and
Princess Diana, Woody Allen, Madonna, Michael Jackson and Lisa Marie
Presley, and endless variations on the O.J. Simpson case. The stories on each
show look very much alike. There are lots of flashy pictures and graphics.
Most of each show consists of teasers of upcoming segments that promise us
juicy details. (In our next segment, Princess Di's podiatrist reveals all!)
If sensationalistic scandals and odd anecdotes not realistically bearing
on substantive policy issues are the basic source of political
judgments, the system cannot work.' °
On Channel 15, there is an attack ad comparing Senator Frank Lautenberg
with State Senator Chuck Haytaian. (Paid for by Citizens for Haytaian.) It
looks a lot like a comparison of Anacin with Bufferin. Lautenberg says this but
Haytaian says that. Lautenberg has done this but Haytaian will do that.
Haytaian has more of the pain relievers doctors recommend. Buy-uh-Vote
Haytaian for United States Senate.
On CNN, it's Crossfire, a prime example of democratic deliberation in the
electronic age. Michael Kinsley and John Sununu are going after the guests,
who can't seem to get a word in edgewise. Now they are going after each
other. Nobody gets to talk for more than five seconds without being
interrupted. I decide to interrupt them. Zap.
We keep flipping. If something doesn't catch our interest in a few seconds,
we keep on moving. There is a debate between the gubernatorial candidates for
the State of Utah on C-SPAN. Zap. A discussion of educational policy on
C-SPAN2. Zap. There are documentaries on the Learning Channel and the
Discovery Channel. Zap. Zap. The evening news on CNN. Zap. Catholic TV.
Zap. Talk show on CNBC. Zap. Six channels worth of Branford Community
Access. Zap. Zap. Zap. Zap. Zap. Zap.
9. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 21.
10. Id. at 20-21.
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It is also important to ensure not merely that diversity is available, but
also that a significant part of the citizenry is actually exposed to
diverse views about public issues."
We go back to The Simpsons (Homer, not O.J.). Homer is screwing things
up again. He's a kick. I wonder if I am being a bad citizen. Perhaps I should
be informing myself about public issues. Perhaps I should be learning about
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But hey, I did my part. I read
Sunstein's book on the First Amendment today. But instead of a law professor,
what if I were a steelworker? A bus driver? A waitress? A telephone sales
grunt? In short, what if I had a real job?
[No political regime can or should insist that citizens be thinking
about politics all, most, or even much of the time; people have many
other things to do. But lack of interest in information about
government should not be taken as inevitable or as a product of
"human nature." We know enough to know that lack of interest is
often a result of inadequate education, perceived powerlessness,
unsatisfactory alternatives, or a belief that things cannot really be
changed. Indifference to politics is frequently produced by insufficient
information, the costs of gaining more knowledge, poor educational
background, or, more generally, an unjust status quo.'
2
"Doh!" Homer exclaims.
Margret and I, in an apparent fit of false consciousness, flip to E!, the
"Entertainment and News Authority." E! is completely devoted to the news of
the entertainment industry. Just as news programs are becoming more like
entertainment, so entertainment itself has become an important component of
the news. This phenomenon starts at the beginning of the century with the
lowly gossip column, and gradually swallows up large parts of news coverage.
The lives of celebrities-particularly their private lives-are the events of the
day. They are public discourse-they are what people are talking about. 3
Margret and I flip and watch, watch and flip. Poor educational background
does not explain why we are watching television this evening. Lack of
alternatives does not explain it. Our house is overflowing with books and
magazines. They are piled on the floor in front of us. We are not looking at
them now. We are watching. Watching television.
Busy people cannot be expected or required to devote all or most of
their time to public issues. One of the advantages of a representative
system-not to mention one with a large bureaucracy-is that it
11. I& at 22.
12. Id. at 21.
13. On the history of this development, see generally NEAL GABLiER, WIN-IELL: Gossip. POWER. AND
THE CULTURE OF CELEBRITY (1994).
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allows the citizenry to devote its attention to subjects other than
politics. But it is hardly unrealistic to assess a system of free
expression by examining whether it generates broad and deep
attention to public issues, and whether it brings about public exposure
to an appropriate diversity of view. These are not utopian goals. 4
Zap. On MTV, Sheryl Crow's new video is just beginning. Sheryl is
dressed with just the hint of requisite sluttiness apparently now demanded of
women who appear on MTV (with the possible exception of Hillary Clinton
and Mother Teresa). She (Sheryl, not Mother Teresa) is wearing glossy
lipstick, a short skirt, a metric ton of hair mousse, and 70's-style clunky
platform high heels. On MTV, I guess, that's how you have to look.
Stimulate or die.
(You wouldn't want someone to flip past you, now would you?)
Sheryl sings:
All I wanna do is have a little fun before I die
Says the man next to me out of nowhere
It's apropos of nothing
He says his name is William
But I'm sure he's Bill or Billy or Mac or Buddy.
And he's plain ugly to me
And I wonder if he's ever had a day of fun in his whole life. 5
Zap. On C-SPAN there's a discussion of Clinton's foreign policy. I keep
flipping. I check out The Simpsons again. Inside Edition. VI-. I mistakenly
land on C-SPAN. Oops. Zap. Zap. Zap. I keep flipping. I am being a very bad
boy.
It might be objected that some of these strategies will merely get
people to change the channel, to turn off the television, or to turn to
other kinds of entertainment. This risk is especially severe for
regulatory strategies that attempt to counter current audience desires
for entertainment. A requirement of one hour of public affairs
programming per night, for example, would probably produce a large
diminution in the audience. This is of course a real possibility, and
any regulatory efforts must be attentive to the risk. But it is hardly
clear that a decision to turn off the television would be genuinely
harmful for the individuals or for society, at least if the relevant
programming is low quality and does not contribute to Madisonian or
other social goals.
16
14. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22.
15. SHERYL CROW, All I Wanna Do, on TuESDAY NiGHT Music CLUB (A&M Records 1993).
16. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 89.
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Zap. Sheryl and her band stand outside the corner of an abandoned movie
theater. The passersby hear her music. They throw quarters into her guitar
case. Magically, they expand as if filled up with helium, and float delightedly,
like huge human balloons, towards the stars.
Sheryl sings:
All I wanna do
Is have some fun
I've got a feeling
I'm not the only one.
All I wanna do
Is have some fun
'Til the sun comes up over Santa Monica Boulevard.
All over America, millions of cable subscribers, induced no doubt by
unjust background conditions, are flipping past The MacNeillLehrer NewsHour,
past the Discovery Channel, past CNN, past the local news. They are watching
soap operas, made-for-TV movies, gossip shows dressed up as investigative
journalism, interviews with Tom Cruise, silly sitcoms, titillating talk shows,
music videos with pouty women writhing in a sea of morphing graphics. What
they are watching is fast, funny, raucous, loud, lewd, low-rent, and
mesmerizing.
Above all it is entertaining.
There is reason to believe that viewing habits, like many other
customs and cultural practices, are extremely vulnerable to large-scale
shifts on the basis of relatively mild government interventions.... In
any case there is no good basis for supposing that current tastes and
habits are rigidly fixed.
17
In living rooms around the country, people are engaging in dialogue of a
certain sort. They are responding with their remote controls. They are voting
with their fingertips. The people are speaking. They are demanding something.
They are demanding entertainment.
They want their MTV.
And if they are not entertained, they will exercise their inalienable right
to zap.
It is not unacceptably elitist to favor a system of free expression
that promotes attention to public issues and diversity of view. Of
course, it is possible or even likely that the well-educated will
disproportionately enjoy high-quality broadcasting. But this is
precisely because they have been educated to do so, and high-quality
17. Id at 90.
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education is not something to be disparaged. It has a point. Indeed,
we should think of the broadcasting media as part of a system of
public education designed to serve all those who need it; and there is
nothing elitist about that. Even if higher-quality broadcasting is seen
disproportionately by the well-educated, its benefits will hardly be
restricted to people who are already well informed. Many people who
are not college graduates should benefit a great deal from such
programming. Indeed, they may receive disproportionately high
benefits.'8
Zap. I flip past CNN, past C-SPAN, past C-SPAN2, past The Mary 7yler
Moore Show, past the infomercial, past the attack ads on channel 3, past the
six channels of Branford public access. I am back to MTV. Sheryl is still
there. She sings dreamily, to no one in particular:
All I wanna to do
is have some fun
I've got a feeling
I'm not the only one.
All I wanna do
is have some fun
'Til the sun comes up over Santa Monica Boulevard.
IX. THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
Sunstein's book is an attempt at a new liberal synthesis of First
Amendment theory; in particular, he attempts to reconcile the traditional left-
liberal defenses of free speech with contemporary problems of campaign
finance, mass media regulation, advertising power, pornography, and racist
speech.' 9 His focus on these problems is not accidental. It reflects the
increasing sense among liberals that libertarian solutions in these areas have
become unacceptable-an example of a more general phenomenon I call the
"ideological drift" of the free speech principle.2" It is a tribute to Sunstein's
ingenuity that he succeeds as well as he does in his task of reconciliation. Yet
in so doing, he exposes a crucial fault line in theories of free speech and
constitutional law generally-a fault line organized around the meaning and
value of popular culture.
Although Sunstein calls his book Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech, it could with equal justification have been called "Free Speech and the
18. Id. at 91.
19. Id. at xviii-xix.
20. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993); J.M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J.
375, 375-87 [hereinafter Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism].
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Problem of Democratic Culture." The "Problem" that concerns him is nothing
less than the accelerating degradation of public culture-a degradation both in
the character of the public's viewing choices and the quality of public
discourse generally. 2' This concern motivates and shapes Sunstein's attempts
at reconciling liberal demands for greater regulation with traditional liberal
defenses of freedom of speech. He harmonizes the two by appealing to an
ideal of rational public discourse. The task of law, he believes, is to approach
this ideal through wise regulation. Yet this ideal of rational discourse is
necessarily posed against existing popular attitudes and preferences; hence it
necessarily involves a comparison in which the latter are judged and found
wanting.
Of all of the many interesting issues in Sunstein's book, this theme is the
most pervasive and the most important. And his crusade to mold public culture
nearer to this ideal raises a large if largely obscured issue: What attitude
should constitutional theorists take towards the beliefs and attitudes of ordinary
citizens and the products of popular culture? I say "constitutional theorist," and
not "constitutional theory," for theory is not a bloodless matrix of ideas but a
practice of individuals and groups. Theory is always performed by a subject
situated within a social setting and within a tradition of practice; it is the
product of a subject who brings her subjectivity to an object, and pronounces
judgment upon it. Hence the question I ask about the nature of popular culture
is equally a question about the nature of the legal academic and her attitudes
as an academic towards this culture.' Sunstein does not pose the question in
these terms; yet his book has a distinctive attitude about popular will and
popular culture, an attitude that distinguishes and colors all of his constitutional
scholarship.
I want to talk about constitutional theory's relationship to popular attitudes
and popular culture in terms of two opposed positions-one I shall call
populist and the other progressivist.' The distinction between populism and
21. Consider, for example, this eloquent cri de coeur.
[I]t would not be an overstatement to say that much of the free speech "market" now consists
of scandals, sensationalized anecdotes, and gossip, often about famous movie stars and athletes;
deals rarely with serious issues and then almost never in depth: usually offers conclusions
without reasons; turns much political discussion into the equivalent of advertisments: treats
most candidates and even political commitments as commodities to be "sold"; perpetuates a
bland, watered-down version of conventional morality on most issues; often tends to avoid real
criticisms of existing practice from any point of view; and reflects an accelerating "race to the
bottom" in terms of the quality and quantity of attention that it requires.
SUNSrEIN, supra note 1, at 23.
22. This inquiry is a special case of the "problem of the subject" that is a central concern of
postmodem jurisprudence. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and
the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE LJ. 105 (1993); Pierre Schlag. The Problem of the Subject.
69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991).
23. Richard Parker has recently called for a revival of constitutional populism. See RiCiARD D.
PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTIUONAL POPULIST MANIFES (1994). Parker calls the
sensibility he opposes "Anti-Populist," and he argues that it is the dominant form of constituuonal
discourse. Id. at 56. His description of this dominant discourse has many affinities to what I call
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progressivism is orthogonal to the more familiar distinction between "left" and
"right." An opposition between progressivism and populism exists wholly
within left-liberal discourse, just as one exists within the discourse of
conservatives; we might say that the two sets of oppositions form a box of
four.24 However, for purposes of this essay I want to focus primarily on the
discourse of left-liberals, because it is the ideological community in which both
Sunstein and I (and a great many other legal academics) are located.2
5
By "populism" and "progressivism," I mean to invoke the spirit of two
successive reform movements in American history, the first primarily agrarian
and the second urban. 26 Despite their differences, progressivism and populism
had many similarities, so much so in fact that the two are easily confused.
Many of the reforms advocated by populists in the late nineteenth century-for
example, direct election of senators, the eight-hour day, graduated income
taxation, and currency reform-were put in place by progressives in the early
twentieth century, albeit for somewhat different reasons.27 Thus, although I
am particularly interested in the ways in which populism and progressivism
diverge, the two should not be seen as diametrically opposed. They were and
are often uneasy allies, but allies they have been nevertheless. Moreover, when
I speak of "populism" and "progressivism" today, I am necessarily
extrapolating from events in American history to offer principles that might
help us understand trends in contemporary political debates. This is an exercise
in the description of ideal types; few people can be said to match the portraits
I offer in all respects. 28
"progressivism." I prefer the term "progressivism" for two reasons. First, this term links contemporary
attitudes to an ongoing historical tradition of political thought. Second, it attempts to give this tradition its
due as a coherent and viable way of thinking about politics that is much more than a simple opposition to
populism.
24. For example, in the 1896 election the concept of "the progressive society"--one devoted to rational
progress, civic duty, and social order-was offered by the Republican defenders of the values of the Gilded
Age against what was thought to be a dangerous populist insurgency. See LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE
POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA 272-73 (1978).
25. I should add here that the approach of some critical race theory suggests still another vantage
point, which has many affinities to what I am calling "populism" but is by no means identical to it.
26. ROBERT W. CHERNY, POPULISM, PROGRESSIVISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NEBRASKA
POLrTCS, 1885-1915, at 151-66 (1981); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131-34 (1955).
27. CHERNY, supra note 26, at 94; see also GOODWYN, supra note 24, at 267-69; HOFsTAOTER, supra
note 26, at 134; SAMUEL E. MORISON El AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 439
(1977).
28. The emphasis on an ideal type is especially important because of basic terminological difficulties
in assigning a fixed meaning to the word "populist." For example, some historians limit the term to
members and followers of the Populist Party because they are particularly interested in why people with
roughly similar ideas stayed within the Democratic and Republican Parties. See, e.g., JEFFREY OSTLER,
PRAIRIE POPUusM: THE FATE OF AGRARIAN RADICALISM IN KANSAS, NEBRASKA, AND IOWA 1880-1892
(1993). Others use the term to refer to a more general political movement that was eventually either
assimilated into or co-opted by the major political parties and which has echoes in later political
developments like the New Deal. See, e.g., JAMES R. GREEN, GRASS-ROOTS SOCIALISM: RADICAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTHWEST 1895-1943 (1978); MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION (1994);
NORMAN POLLACK, THE HUMANE ECONOMY: POPULISM, CAPITALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1990); C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 141-66 (1960). Finally, historians have increasingly
come to recognize the important differences in the concerns of populists in the South and the Midwest. See,
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Although populism and progressivism share a desire for reform, they
diverge most significantly in their attitudes towards the beliefs, attitudes, and
actions of the mass of ordinary citizens. They take different views about
ordinary citizens' private activities, their cultural attachments, and the
possibility of their participation in mass politics.
As its name implies, populism sees itself primarily devoted to furthering
and defending the interests and attitudes of ordinary citizens. It has
traditionally been distrustful of large and powerful organizations, whether
public or private. It views massive government bureaucracy and corporate
privilege with equal suspicion. Moreover, concentrations of power and
privilege held too long by the same persons lead inevitably to moral and
political corruption. This view has two consequences: The first is a preference
for regular rotations of positions of authority and power. The second is a
preference for popular participation in economic and political structures that
affect the lives of ordinary citizens.
Because of its concern about corruption and its insistence that people have
control over the structures of power that affect them, populism has historically
been suspicious of elites-whether academic, social, or political-and their
claims to expertise and superior judgment. It has been especially skeptical of
factual expertise that parades as moral or political expertise.
The purpose of government has both a public and a private aspect for
populists. Government exists to provide individuals and their families and
communities with a chance to live their own lives in dignity, and to allow
them to form relationships with others free from the hand of powerful public
and private forces. Although this description appears to privilege private
interest and association, populism has an equally important public side: It
demands that ordinary people have a say in the decisions that affect them, that
they be able to participate in those structures of power that shape their daily
lives. Thus, populism is based on a particular conception of self-rule and self-
determination, one in which the active participation of the citizenry-when
they choose to participate-is encouraged and facilitated. This interrelation
e.g., STEVEN HAHN, THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE GEORGIA UPCOUNTRY, 1850-1890 (1983) (Southern populism): OSTLER. supra (midwestern
populism); see also William F. Holmes, Why Populism Did Not Flourish in Iowa, 22 REvs. AM. HisT. 608
(1994) (reviewing Ostler). Uke Pollack and Woodward, I believe that there is a line of thought that can
be called "populist" that is manifested in the political spirit of the 1890's but that nevertheless transcends
its particularities. Moreover, I believe this tradition, though subject to variations, resonates throughout
American history from the Revolution to the present day.
The contours of progressivism have similarly generated considerable historical dispute. See. e.g..
ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM (1994) (describing progressivism as inherently
conflicted and self-subverting); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. A.M. HtsT. 113.
123-27 (1982) (describing progressivism not as an intellectual system but as a set of intellectual tools and
identifying at least three different strands of progressive thought). I have profited greatly from David
Rabban's fine discussion of progressive intellectuals' philosophies of free speech and individual rights.
David M. Rabban, The Role of Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought (1995) (unpublished manuscript.
on file with author).
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between the public and private aspects of populism is crucial to understanding
its distinctive character.
People want to be part of governance, but what they want from
government is respect for their ways of living. People wish to participate in
government, but they do not wish to be manipulated and shaped by some
master plan for effective governance. They want the opportunity to have a say
in what affects them, but they also wish to be allowed to live their lives, raise
their children, and pursue their own vision of happiness-whether in families,
friendships, or communities-free from the hand of bureaucratic planning or
corporate overreaching. Populism thus should not be confused either with some
atomistic version of individualism or with currently trendy communitarian
alternatives. Populism is no more committed to individualism in its private
aspects than it is committed to communitarianism in its public ones.29
The dual nature of populism means that political participation is not
something to be forced on the citizenry, nor are popular attitudes some sort of
impure ore that must be carefully filtered, purified, and managed by a wise and
knowing state. From a populist standpoint, such attempts at managerial
purification are paternalistic. They typify elite disparagement and disrespect for
popular attitudes and popular culture. Government should provide opportunities
for popular participation when people seek it, and when they seek it,
government should not attempt to divert or debilitate popular will. An
energized populace, aroused by injustice and pressing for change, is not
something to be feared and constrained; it is the very lifeblood of democracy.
Without avenues for popular participation and without means for popular
control, governments become the enemy of the people; public and private
power become entrenched, self-satisfied, and smug.
Some of these themes will no doubt be familiar; they resonate with parts
of the American political tradition from the Revolution onwards.30 Many have
more pathological versions that will easily spring to mind. What I would like
to stress here, however, is that this way of imagining politics differs from a
considerable amount of reformist discourse among left-liberals. The latter
29. Richard Parker's description of populism emphasizes the importance of energizing people to
participate in politics, and then respecting this energy. PARKER, supra note 23, at 54-65. Because of the
particular focus of his book, he does not sufficiently highlight what I am calling the private aspect of
populist sensibility. A populist might well be concerned that people are not energized politically because
public and private concentrations of power make it difficult for them to be heard and have an influence
over the decisions that affect their lives. These barriers to participation should be removed. Yet ordinary
citizens might have very good reasons for not being politically energized at certain times, since from their
perspective there is considerably more to life than politics-for example, family, friendships, communal
associations, leisure, entertainment, and work. Imposition of a public-issues-centered view of life can itself
be a form of elite disparagement of populist sensibility. See infra part X.
30. For example, we might see elements of populism in revolutionary attitudes towards Britain, in
Anti-Federalism, Jeffersonianism, Jacksonianism, and certain versions of the antebellum Free Labor
Movement.
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approach, which I call progressivism, has a very different attitude towards
popular attitudes and popular culture.
Historically, progressivism has stood for good government and enlightened
public policy in the public interest. Central to progressivism is a faith that
educated and civilized individuals can, through the use of reason, determine
what is best for society as a whole. Persuasion, discussion, and rational
dialogue can lead individuals of different views to see what is in the public
interest. Government and public participation must therefore be structured so
as to produce rational deliberation and consensus about important public policy
issues. Popular culture and popular will have a role to play in this process, but
only after sufficient education and only after their more passionate elements
have been diverted and diffused. Popular anger and uneducated public
sentiments are more likely to lead to hasty and irrational judgments.
Like populists, progressives believe that governments must be freed of
corrupting influences. But these corrupting influences are described quite
differently: They include narrowness of vision, ignorance, and parochial self-
interest. Government must be freed of corruption so that it can wisely debate
what is truly in the public interest. Progressivism is less concerned than
populism about centralization and concentration of power. It recognizes that
some problems require centralized authority and that some enterprises benefit
from economies of scale.3' Progressivism also has a significantly different
attitude towards expertise: Far from being something to be distrusted, it is
something to be particularly prized. Expertise is necessary to arrive at sound
policy judgments; conversely, its lack often leads ordinary citizens to
misunderstand the issues and make choices that are not in the public interest.
Because of its respect for expertise, progressivism has always been quite
comfortable with elite discourse, and progressivism is the natural home for
reformers who are members of political, academic, and social elites.
Populism and progressivism may also be distinguished by their definitions
of democratic culture, and by their views about the relationship between
31. Hence, one version of progressivism--identified with Theodore Roosevelt-argued that
government should not oppose trusts simply because they were large and powerful but should accept large
business organizations as a natural outcome of the evolution of capitalism. The state should therefore
distinguish between "good" trusts, which should be preserved, and "bad" trusts, which should be regulated
and punished. HOFSTADTER, supra note 26, at 246-51.
The example of health care legislation might serve to further distinguish populist and progressive
approaches. From a populist standpoint, universal health care is a means of allowing families to have more
control over their lives. It is a way of allowing them to live their lives with some measure of dignity, and
not to be at the peril either of unscrupulous insurance companies out to make a buck or penny-pinching
government bureaucrats. The bureaucracies of a centralized national health plan are at most a necessary
evil to be avoided where possible at all costs.
From the standpoint of progressivism, universal health care is the government's duty towards its
citizens. It is something that is necessary because health is a public good, and because individuals will
make insufficient investments in health care due to budgetary constraints and insufficient information. Their
choices in this regard, although due to insufficient income and information, may not be in their best
interests.
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popular culture and democratic culture. One can see the debate between
populism and progressivism as a debate over what a truly "democratic" culture
is. For progressives, democratic culture is a culture in which the progressive
ideal of democracy can flourish. It is a culture in which people engage in
rational deliberation about important public issues, and in which each person
has the opportunity and the obligation to discuss such matters through rational
dialogue. However, precisely because popular culture is never like this, and
because an enormous amount of discourse in society does not correspond to
this model, democratic culture is an ideal which is opposed to popular culture
and from which popular culture is always seen as a fall. At best, popular
culture is a distraction from the business of political life; it is something
people turn to when they are not otherwise occupied with the business of
democratic deliberation.
By contrast, populism sees a less radical division between democratic
culture and popular culture. Democratic culture is the culture through which
ordinary citizens express themselves, and it is by no means restricted to
discussions of politics. Democratic culture is "democratic" in the sense that
everyone gets to participate in it. In so doing, it ranges over the political, the
economic, and the social aspects of life; this conception of democratic culture
is consistent with the populist notion that economic as well as political
structures of power should be made more democratic.32 Thus, populism tends
to merge democratic culture and popular culture, while progressivism tends to
separate the two. For populists, popular culture is neither a debilitated version
of democratic culture nor a mere diversion from the sober processes of
deliberation imagined by progressivism. It is not a sideshow or distraction from
democratic culture but the main event. Moreover, populism accepts, as
progressivism does not, that popular culture-which is also democratic
culture-is by nature unkempt and unruly, occasionally raucous and even
vulgar. It is by turns both eloquent and mawkish, noble and embarrassing, wise
and foolish, resistant to blandishments and gullible in the extreme. It is
imperfect in precisely the same sense that democracy itself is imperfect.
It is important here to note the relationship between popular culture and
the mass culture that is the product of economic and technological
developments in the twentieth century. Much of mass culture involves
programming, advertisements, architecture, and artwork produced by
corporations and designed to sell products and make money. Many critiques
of mass culture warn of the deleterious consequences of consumerism and
mass consumption. The populist conception of democratic culture is not
necessarily inconsistent with these insights. Populists can be highly critical of
32. See GOODWYN, supra note 24, at 294-96, 302-03; BRUCE PALMER, "MAN OVER MONEY": THE
SOUTHERN POPULIST CRMQUE OF AMERICAN CAPITAUSM 31, 199-220 (1980); POLLACK, supra note 28,
at 86, 113-21.
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corporate attempts to manipulate people and sap their political energies. And
populists are likely to be suspicious of elites not only in government, but also
those in large media organizations.33 But a populist view also emphasizes that
ordinary people are not mere passive receptors of the messages offered in
advertising, television programming, and other elements of contemporary mass
culture. Such assumptions are just another way of denigrating the intelligence
and abilities of ordinary people. People do not uncritically absorb and
assimilate the images they see on the television screen-they process, discuss,
and appropriate them.?4 People are active interpreters and rearrangers of what
they find in mass culture.35 They use the raw materials of mass culture to
articulate and express their values. Through this process, they produce and
reproduce popular culture.
Populism was supplanted by progressivism at the turn of the century, and
as Lawrence Goodwyn has noted, the contemporary political position that we
call liberalism is much more the heir of progressivism than of populism.3
6
Indeed, nowadays people are likely to use the word "progressive" as a
synonym (or a euphemism) for "liberal" or "left"; in this practice I myself
have been as guilty as anyone else. Although aspects of populism still remain
in liberal discourse, I think it is fair to say that progressivism is the more
dominant sensibility. This is especially so in the academy, where most
constitutional theorizing occurs.37
One effect of the hegemony of progressivism in defining the character of
liberal thought is that its populist possibilities have been more or less
submerged. The enduring connections between liberalism and progressivism
have made liberalism continually susceptible to populist attacks from the right:
A good example is George Wallace's assaults on the liberal media and "pointy
headed" intellectuals. 3' The connections between liberalism and progressivism
have also led to constant and persuasive claims that liberals are out of touch
with and even hostile to the concerns of ordinary Americans. The
contemporary Republican party has understood this lesson well. By discarding
or disguising conservative elitism and offering a rightward spin on populist
rhetoric, conservative Republicans have repeatedly trapped liberal Democrats
33. Suspicion of the press as just another out-of-touch elite is a familiar populist theme, as an: attacks
on the "liberal media" using right-wing populist rhetoric.
34. See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN E' AL. COMMON KNOWLEDGE: NEWS AND THE CONSTRLCYION OF
POLITICAL MEANING 17-22, 60-77 (1992).
35. See JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE (1989); JOHN B. THO.tPSON., IDEOLOGY AND
MODERN CULTURE 24-25, 105, 116, 318-319 (1990).
36. GOODWYN, supra note 24, at 269-70.
37. Cf PARKER, supra note 23, at 66-67 & n.32 (arguing that antipopulist sentiment dominates
contemporary constitutional law).
38. ThE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 376 (Lewis D. Eigen & Jonathan P.
Siegal eds., 1990).
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into a progressivist mode that continually pits them against the sensibilities of
many ordinary citizens.39
m11. THE PECULIAR POSITION OF THE POPULIST THEORIST
There is an important and unacknowledged tension between populism and
progressivism in constitutional theory, and constitutional theorists could learn
a great deal from the populist sensibility.40 This is particularly so because of
the natural affinities between progressivism and academic life. Progressivism
values the contributions of elites and experts, and academic discourse is a form
of elite discourse. Despite their often egalitarian views, legal academics are
socialized into a culture that privileges elite values.41 After all, like everyone
else, academics hope to succeed in their chosen calling; and they tend to
distinguish themselves by being smarter, by being more learned, and by
possessing greater expertise. Thus, saying that legal academics have tendencies
towards elitism is like saying that they have tendencies towards breathing
oxygen. An encounter with populist values may help balance their natural
proclivities.
Yet populism is hardly without its limitations. Indeed, both populism and
progressivism have symmetrical failings, each of which is more easily
recognized from the opposite perspective. History teaches us that populism has
recurring pathologies; it is especially important to recognize and counteract
them. These dangers are particularly obvious to academics and other
intellectual elites: They include fascism, nativism, anti-intellectualism,
39. The Democratic party leadership's failure to profit from this lesson is testimony to the dominance
of progressivism in the imagination of liberal political elites. An excellent study of the Republican strategy
and its consequences is found in THOMAS B. EDSALL WITH MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION (1991),
which describes how pathological populist tendencies towards racism have been manipulated by the
Republican party. A blueprint of how conservative Republicans might be attacked by an economic populist
is offered in KEvIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990). Indeed, one way of understanding
some of the successes of the 1992 Clinton campaign and the subsequent failures of the Clinton
Administration is to trace the ebb and flow of populist versus progressivist rhetoric and positions offered
by this chameleon-like politician. Quite aside from his many other difficulties, Clinton has tended to
succeed more when he is perceived as a committed economic populist who cares about ordinary people and
less when he is perceived as a progressive, elitist, bureaucracy-loving policy wonk.
40. I am not alone in this conclusion. See PARKER, supra note 23. I also see elements of populism in
Akhil Amar's work. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1131-33 (1991) (discussing majoritarian focus of Bill of Rights). Two aspects of Amar's work are
particularly worth noting. The first is Amar's emphasis on the jury as an institution of popular sovereignty,
The second is his emphasis on textual argument. Of all the modalities of constitutional argument, textualism
tends to emphasize the kinds of constitutional arguments that ordinary citizens can make and understand.
In this respect, it is probably no accident that Hugo Black, the former Senator from Alabama, was also a
proponent of textualism. Finally, James Gray Pope has even given a populist spin to civic republicanism,
which at least in its recent revival has been more progressivist than populist. See James Gray Pope,
Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 287 (1990).
41. The conflict between elitism and egalitarianism in American law schools is well captured in JULIUS




persecution of unpopular minorities, exaltation of the mediocre, and romantic
exaggeration of the wisdom and virtue of the masses.12 What is more difficult
for many academics to recognize is that progressivism has its own distinctive
dangers and defects. Unfortunately, these tend to be less visible from within
a progressivist sensibility. They include elitism, paternalism, authoritarianism,
naivete, excessive and misplaced respect for the "best and brightest," isolation
from the concerns of ordinary people, an inflated sense of superiority over
ordinary people, disdain for popular values, fear of popular rule, confusion of
factual and moral expertise, and meritocratic hubris.
I have suggested that legal academics can learn something from populism
and that they should fashion constitutional theories that are more sensitive to
populist concerns. Yet the academic who advocates populism is still the
member of an intellectual elite; she still writes in academic journals and speaks
in the language of academic theory. Thus, a debate about the merits of
populism versus progressivism is not a debate between progressivist
intellectuals and academic representatives of "the people." It is a debate among
intellectual elites within the legal academy about their proper relationship to
popular culture and their appropriate understanding of attitudes and beliefs of
ordinary citizens. Constitutional theorists may be able to offer a populist
constitutional theory, but what they will inevitably produce is a populist
constitutional theory clothed in the language of academic discourse and
directed to other academics.
Thus, my argument about the lessons of populism is as much a point about
the sociology of knowledge as it is about political theory. To give populism
its due requires that academics realize that their social situation, their values,
the kinds of work they perform, and the kinds of discourses they practice all
42. There is considerable controversy among historians over the degree to which American populism
succumbed to nativism, racism, and anti-Semitism, and over the question of whether populism is an
inherently intolerant political philosophy. See James Turner. Understanding rite Populists, 67 J. AM. HIST
354 (1980). Writing in the 1950's, Richard Hofstadter portrayed the populists as anti-intellectuals of limited
imagination, seeing obvious parallels to McCarthyism. See HoFsTADTER. supra note 26. at 60-93.
Nevertheless, Hofstadter's influential portrait has continually been subjected to criticism. Other historians
have stressed that the populists were no more intolerant than establishment America and in many cases
were more tolerant because of their own sense of marginalization. See. e.g.. WALTER T. NucE"r. THIE
TOLERANT POPULISTS: KANSAS POPULISM AND NATIViSs, (1963); NOR AN POLLACK. TIlE POPULIST
RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: MIDWESTrRN PoPULIST THoUGHT (1962); C. VANN WOODWARD. The
Populist Heritage and the Intellectual, in THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY. supra note 28. at 141. In
these debates, distinctions between populists in the Midwest, West. and South become particularly salient.
Many Southern populists, faced with attacks from comnmercial and political elites, often turned to race
baiting, either as a political strategy to shore up their political base for reform, or out of disillusionment
with the possibilities for democratic change in an America increasingly dominated by large concentrations
of wealth and corporate power. The career of Tom Watson. who mutated from radical egalitarian to racist
demagogue, is symbolic of the Faustian bargain of Southern populism. See C. VANN WOODWARD. To.mt
WATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL (1955).
Beneath the surface of debates over the dangers of populism lie more troubling questions about the
assumed superior morality, tolerance, and political intelligence of political and academic elites. Identifying
the tradition of populism with passion and intolerance often implies a contrasting identification of elite
discourse with reason and lack of prejudice, an identification that may be more imagined than deserved.
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tend to distance them from the lived experience and perspectives of most
Americans. Many legal academics in particular lead lives of comparative
privilege and high status. They are well compensated for relatively easy and
enjoyable work, and that work focuses disproportionately on issues of public
policy and matters of public concern. They inhabit a culture that places heavy
emphasis on elite values and expertise, and they engage in a form of discourse
that is often obscure and even irrelevant to the vast majority of people in this
country.
If critical race theory and feminism have taught us anything, it is that one
cannot begin to understand the situation of others until one also understands
one's differences from them and how this difference affects one's ways of
seeing the world. If we do not investigate the relationship between our social
situation and our perspectives, we may confuse our conception of what is
reasonable with Reason itself. If we do not see how our reason is both enabled
and limited by our position, we may think our judgments positionless and
universal. We may find the perspectives of those differently situated
unreasonable, bizarre, and even dangerous, or we may not even recognize the
possibility of another way of looking at things. What is true of race and gender
is also true of professional training and social position. If legal academics are
to learn something from populism, they must first try to understand the
professional perspective from which they offer their judgments and the kinds
of rhetoric they use to offer them.43
For me, it is particularly telling that Richard Parker chooses to introduce
his "Constitutional Populist Manifesto" through a close textual reading of a
short story by Thomas Mann." Parker offers this discussion with little
recognition of the incongruity of this device. Yet the idea that the advantages
of populism will be revealed to us by a Harvard Law professor discussing the
structuralist oppositions at work in early twentieth-century German literature
is emblematic of the peculiar position of the populist constitutional theorist.45
A constitutional theorist who wants to incorporate populist insights must
avoid two symmetrical errors. The first is engaging in an indulgent
romanticism about the inherent wisdom and goodness of the people.
Respecting and learning from the perspectives of ordinary citizens is not the
43. The argument I am making here is related to the critique of the objectivity of legal reasoning that
appears in critical race theory and feminism, although I am not sure whether one should call the latter
positions "populist." What all three share is the recognition that the exercise of reason is affected by the
community one reasons within. Being an academic, and in particular being a legal or political theorist, is
itself one way of being situated-it is constitutive of our thought rather than transparent to it. Immersion
in academic culture does not merely allow us to see the world more clearly and correctly; it also colors and
even distorts our perceptions of it. As we worry about the effects of race, gender, and sexual orientation
in dividing academic thought, we must not forget that what all of us have in common-our status as
academic intellectuals-also has its own ideological effects.
44. See PARKER, supra note 23, at 9-49.
45. And one might make a similar comment about my use of postmoderist philosophy and the
sociology of knowledge to make these remarks about Parker.
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same thing as uncritical acceptance. This is especially so since "ordinary
citizens" are not an undifferentiated mass. They differ in their attitudes and
concerns every bit as much as academics differ among themselves. The fantasy
of the unadulterated goodness and wisdom of those who live beyond the ivory
towers of academia is precisely that, a fantasy; the romance of "the people"
and their mores is the sort of infatuation characteristic of someone who has not
yet lived with the object of her affections on a daily basis.
The second error is the tendency to speak as a representative of "the
people," rather than as a privileged academic who seeks to recognize the value
of populism in her scholarship. Those who make this mistake will inevitably
be faced with the rebuttal that they are not truly "of the people." In particular,
such academics are highly vulnerable to accusations that the cars they drive,
the books they read, the circles in which they travel, the houses and
neighborhoods in which they live, and the schools to which they send their
children are inappropriate for those who profess solidarity with the great
unwashed. Hence their populist and egalitarian rhetoric shows them to be at
best fuzzy-headed dreamers and at worst moral and political hypocrites.46
The way to avoid the force of such criticisms is to avoid the causes that
occasion them. A populist constitutional theory must begin not with an
examination of the ordinary citizen but with the theorist herself: The
constitutional theorist must consider how her own position as an academic
distances her from the experiences and views to which she tries to give
credence.47 She must understand how she is the bearer of a distinctive
subculture that colors and even distorts her views about what is most important
in life. This is not a claim that constitutional theorists have nothing in common
with ordinary people-a preposterous suggestion-but rather that there are
some things that they do not have in common, and that these may be
overlooked in the very process of theorizing.
The tension produced by the academic's position qua academic does not
arise so urgently for progressives, because progressivism is a more natural
position for intellectual elites. In comparison to the populist, the progressive
academic feels less discontinuity between her beliefs and her social situation.
Progressivism tends to emphasize and admire the sorts of things academics
themselves tend to value-expertise, erudition, reasoned debate, and
deliberation. Moreover, progressivism tends to identify these qualities with the
very ideals of reasoned deliberation it exalts. The perspective of elites tends
46. For a routine example of the genre, see Brian Timmons. That's No Okie. That's My Torts
Professor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1990, at A20 (ad hominem attack on Harvard Law School CLS professor
for allegedly owning a Jaguar). Perhaps this form of rhetorical attack should be recognized as a special
subcategory of arguments ad automobilem.
47. The analogous point in feminism and critical race theory is that in attempting to understand
perspectives of minorities and women, whites and males must begin by coming to terms with the privileges
of their whiteness and maleness. See, e.g., Elaine Showalter. Critical Cross-Dressing: Male Femnnuts and
the Woman of the Year, in MEN IN Fe.INISM 116, 126-27 (Alice Jardine & Paul Smith eds., 1987).
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to merge with the perspective of the sort of informed, rational, deliberative
person that progressivism sees as properly engaged in the ideal of democratic
deliberation. As a result, progressivism tends to make the ideological effects
of the academic's social situation invisible to herself. Yet the fact that
progressives may not feel the tension of inconsistency experienced by their
more populist colleagues does not mean that ideological effects are absent from
their thought; it means only that these effects are more difficult for them to
recognize.
IV. THE "MADISONIAN" SYSTEM AND CONTEMPORARY PROGRESSIVISM
In Sunstein's First Amendment theory we find an elegant and impressive
example of constitutional progressivism, and in this Part I shall attempt to
show its progressive roots. Sunstein's theory involves two important ideas. The
first is a two-tier conception of the First Amendment, in which some speech
is of higher constitutional value than others, and hence receives greater
protection. The second idea is that political speech belongs in the highest tier.
Sunstein's first claim is unexceptional. Existing free speech doctrine
already treats some kinds of speech with greater solicitude than other kinds;
for example, novels receive greater protection than commercial speech.
Moreover, there is no particular reason why there have to be only two tiers,
and in fact, Sunstein really offers us three-conduct that is not even considered
"speech," speech in the lower tier, and speech in the higher tier. It is unwise
and in any case impossible to protect all communicative acts to the same
degree. Like life on this Earth, the First Amendment is surely a vale of tiers.
Sunstein's second claim, however, is analytically distinct from the first.
Merely because we will protect some types of speech more than others does
not guarantee what goes into the various categories. Our answer to this
question depends on our view of the purposes behind the First Amendment.
Sunstein sees the value of democratic deliberation as central, and hence he
places political speech at its core. Nevertheless, if one believed that autonomy,
truth seeking, cultural development, and democracy were equally important
values, one might have a different allocation of core and periphery.
Sunstein believes that his theory best fits existing doctrine, and "receives
firm support from history., 48 He calls his approach to free speech a
"Madisonian" theory to highlight its connections to the political philosophy of
the Framers. This conception holds, among other things, that "[l]iberal rights
are pervasively democratic," and that "[o]ne of their prime functions is to
furnish the preconditions for democratic deliberation. 49 In Sunstein's view,
what is most characteristic of the "Madisonian" approach is "its skepticism
48. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 132.
49. Id. at 248.
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about external or transcendental foundations; its fear of institutional bias and
partiality... and perhaps above all in its association of truth in politics with
what emerges from a well-functioning political process.' ' 5
These positions are certainly characteristic of contemporary neopragmatism
and civic republicanism, but it is quite unclear that they can be traced to
Madison or to the Founding Fathers generally. In fact, Sunstein's "Madisonian"
theory of the First Amendment is about as Madisonian as Madison, Wisconsin:
It is a tribute to a great man and his achievements, but bears only a limited
connection to his actual views. Madison surely believed in democracy-of a
restricted sort-and he also believed in free speech as a means to guarantee
democracy. However, his theory of free speech seems to have been based in
significant part on an analogy to property rights.5 ' Madison was more likely
to believe that the state existed to protect individual rights or natural rights
than that such rights existed to serve the just interests of the state.52 Nor is
there much indication that as a philosopher of truth Madison was a closet
neopragmatist. If Sunstein's theory shares anything with Madison, it is not his
commitment to democracy but his antidemocratic tendencies; like any good
Federalist, Sunstein recognizes the need to restrain popular will by filtering
popular sentiment through the more dispassionate expertise of elected
representatives.53
As in his more general constitutional theory of civic republicanism,
Sunstein's use of history is a respectful gesture towards original intention, a
selective discovery of his own theoretical preoccupations in the materials of
the past, made necessary because he is a constitutional lawyer and that is what
lawyers do. Sunstein is often quite open about this; although he sometimes
uses original understandings to support particular arguments, he does not
believe that constitutional interpreters should be limited by the original
understandings of the First Amendment.' Hence, we must consider his use
of the term "Madisonian" a necessary obeisance to the rhetorical requirements
of constitutional theory, for nowhere in the book does Sunstein suggest that he
would find a particular result desirable but that it is, unfortunately, prohibited
by the original understanding of the Framers or the views of James Madison.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZEtTE, Mar. 29. 1792- reprinted in T IE MtND OF
THE FOUNDER 243 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973) (asserting that every "man has a property in his opinions
and the free communication of them").
52. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ULMITS OF A1mERICAN CONsTmT 1TONALISMI
(1990); John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L REV. 1751 (1994) (reviewing
CASS R. SUNStEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITION (1993)). It is not necessary to go so far as these authors
and claim that Madison's theory of free speech was centrally or exclusively concerned with these matters.
It is enough merely to note that there are very significant aspects of his thought that are unaccounted for
in Sunstein's use of history.
53. See, for example, his criticisms of electronic populism in Cass R. Sunstein. The First Amendment
in Cyberspace, 104 YALE LJ. 1757 (1995).
54. SUNSTEiN, supra note 1, at 132.
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We will better understand the nature of Sunstein's theory of free speech
if we look elsewhere for family resemblances. Indeed, in his continual
emphasis on the need for society to shape private preferences to serve public
and democratic ends, Sunstein seems much closer to John Dewey than to
James Madison.5 5 It is of course no great shame to offer a theory influenced
by one of America's greatest philosophers and surely its greatest philosopher
of education. Of course, unlike James Madison, John Dewey was not one of
the Founding Fathers nor the author of the words contained in the First
Amendment. But this should detain us only if we had hoped to gain some
undeserved measure of political authority from the invocation of Madison's
name.
Dewey emphasized the need to educate the citizenry to prepare them for
democracy and participation in democratic institutions.56 He believed in a
social interest that transcended the interests of any particular individual and to
which individuals had to conform. Because Dewey saw no fundamental
opposition between individual and society, and because he argued that
individuals were created by the society in which they lived, he viewed
individualism and individual rights as social constructs that served (and should
serve) the larger interests of society as a whole. 8 Finally, Dewey argued that
political truth is the result of a process rather than a matter of
correspondence.5 9 Not unsurprisingly, all of these appear as themes in
Sunstein's constitutional theory.6 In his emphasis on the social construction
of preferences, in his insistence on the educative functions of politics, and in
his optimism that a common good can be derived from public deliberation
about the great issues of the day, Sunstein sounds remarkably Deweyite, if not
Dewey-eyed.
We will also better understand the nature of Sunstein's theory once we
recognize that it is the latest in a long line of process-based theories of the
First Amendment. Although Alexander Meiklejohn is mentioned only twice in
this book,6' it is no accident that Sunstein replicates most of his positions,
and that, like Meiklejohn, Sunstein is largely disappointed with the
55. This comparison is well made by Rabban, supra note 28, at 154-55.
56. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 260-61 (MacMillan 1966) (1916); John
Dewey, Ethical Principles Underlying Education, in THIRD YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL HERnAxr
SOCIETY 7 (1897), reprinted in 5 EARLY WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 54, 59-60 (1972); John Dewey, My
Pedagogic Creed, SCHOOL J., Jan. 1897, at 77-80, reprinted in 5 EARLY WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, supra,
at 93.
57. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 303-04, 482-83 (1913). This view underlies
his equation of the moral and the social. See DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 56, at
358-59.
58. DEWEY & TUFrS, ETHICS, supra note 57; DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 56,
at 305, 359-60.
59. See DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 56, at 338-45.
60. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19, 91, 241-50; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTrrUTION (1993).
61. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 38, 122.
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performance of the mass media and popular culture in promoting democratic
values.62 Moreover, as if condemned by a family curse to repeat the sins of
his ancestors, Sunstein manages to replicate most of the theoretical difficulties
inherent in Meiklejohn's views. To use Robert Post's apt expression, process-
based theorists like Meiklejohn and Sunstein are managers of public
discourse-they hope to use law to ensure the right mix of statements and
positions. 63 The point, as Meiklejohn put it, "is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said."' Decisions about what is
"worth saying"-for example, what mix of positions constitutes sufficient
diversity-naturally fall to those designing and enforcing the regulatory
system. Hence free speech policy becomes an exercise in managerial expertise,
which at its best produces lively debate in the service of democracy, and at its
worst is a form of political flower arrangement that crushes the life out of the
unruly and unkempt carnival of public discourse. Such an approach is rooted
in the progressivist vision that emerges in the early twentieth century. It is a
desire for good government in the public interest produced with the assistance
of scientific expertise and the leadership of intellectual elites.6S
Once we recognize the origins of this theory of free speech, we find that
it bears the theoretical physiognomy of its ancestors like a distinctive family
nose. As the contemporary equivalent of Deweyan progressivism and the heir
to Meiklejohnian managerialism, it shares with them the following
characteristic features:
(1) A view of individual rights as serving the goals of democracy
and democratic deliberation;
(2) A notion of the "public interest" that rises above the petty
interests of individuals;
(3) An ideal of deliberation and dialogue that is considerably more
managed and stylized than anything that occurs in the real world;
(4) A distrust of popular culture for failing to live up to this ideal;
and
(5) A sense that-perhaps for reasons of unjust social structure
and regulatory failure-the masses are not doing their part in
62. MEIKLEJOHN, POLrTICAL FREEDOM, supro note 4, at 86-88; SUNSTrEtN. supro note 1. at 58-67.
Meiklejohn also anticipates Sunstein's criticisms of Holmes' individualism and skepticism about the
existence of a public interest. MEIKLEiOHN, supra, at 60-62.
63. Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse.
64 U. COO. L. REv. 1109 (1993).
64. MEIKLEiOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM. supro note 4. at 26.
65. Meiklejohn's relationship to progressivism is obscured by the fact that he writes in the middle of
the 20th century. Yet he was born in 1872, which would have made him 40 years old at the time of the
1912 election. His major work, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMEsTr. reprinted in
MEIKLEIOHN, POLTCAL FREEDOM. supra note 4. becomes all the more remarkable when we realize that
it was written at the age of 76; incredibly, The First Amendment Is an Absolute. 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245
[hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First Amendment], his last important essay, was written when Meiklejohn was
almost 90.
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furthering democratic ideals and hence steps must be taken to educate
them to ensure that they engage in democratic deliberation in the
appropriate way.
In short, implicit in the progressivist diagnosis and the progressivist
framing of issues is a nascent distrust and critique of popular culture coupled
with a call for the state to remedy or at least counteract its deficiencies. For
if individuals are socially constructed by the communities in which they
live--or (in Sunstein's preferred language) popular preferences are endogenous
to politics-better politics is the solution to bad culture. In the contemporary
language of civic republicanism this goes by the name of "instilling civic
virtue," and in the language of contemporary communitarianism it goes by the
name of "restoring personal responsibility." So conceived, such theories will
almost always pose themselves against existing preferences of the masses and
existing popular culture. They will usually find themselves opposing some
form of populism, and hence they will usually be accused of some form of
elitism. As I shall discuss later on, Sunstein's theory is no exception to this
rule.' First, however, we must try to understand why a Meiklejohnian
solution to the theory of free speech leads to characteristically Meiklejohnian
problems.
V. SON OF MEIKLEJOHN
From a purely doctrinal perspective, the great difficulty with the
Meiklejohn view has always been explaining why nonpolitical expression like
art, music, and literature should receive the highest level of protection.
Meiklejohn himself at first denied that these forms of expression were
specially protected, but later changed his mind. 67 Of course, the problem of
mapping received understandings about what should be constitutionally
protected is endemic to any monistic theory of free speech; it extends as well
to theories like Sunstein's that recognize a plurality of constitutional values but
permit only one to determine what falls within the core of constitutional
protection.68 Although Sunstein justifies his "Madisonian" conception on the
grounds that it maps received understandings better than other theories,69 this
is surely not the case. It does much worse than theories that recognize multiple
and equal values for the simple reason that our received understandings are
usually the result of considerations that are plural and eclectic.
66. See infra parts VIII & IX.
67. Compare MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 39-40 with Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment, supra note 65, at 262.
68. Compare SLNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 122 (emphasizing that political deliberation is the primary
value) with id. at 129-30 (allowing for plural subsidiary values) and id. at 144-48 (rejecting theory of equal
plural values).
69. Id. at 152.
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Faced with the task of explaining the observed motions of the planets
while insisting that planets moved only around the Earth and only in perfect
circles, the ancient astronomer Ptolemy and his followers hit upon the idea of
epicycles, little circles within circles that the planets traversed on their way
around the center of the universe. 0 Similarly, one can correct the deficiencies
of the Meildejohnian view with epicycles of a different sort, but, as in
Ptolemy's case, the results are not particularly convincing except to those
already committed to the theory. Thus, Meiklejohn eventually claimed that art
and literature were protected because they were necessary for people to vote
and engage in democratic deliberation. 7' This seems somewhat far-fetched,
for it is hardly necessary that everyone read novels, watch ballet, or listen to
music for democracy to succeed. Moreover, it is not clear that all dance,
music, and literature are equally helpful in this task.
Sunstein attempts to solve Meiklejohn's problem through an expansive
definition of "political speech." He defines political speech as speech that is
"both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue.' ' 72 Public deliberation in turn is defined broadly to include any
discussion of "social norms" as well as changes in law or government.73
Moreover, although Sunstein requires that both speaker and receiver must
understand that the speech is political in his sense, he does not press this point
too hard. It is enough if "a few" understand it as such.74 It is not even
necessary that the artist herself understand or intend her work to be "political,"
at least in the ordinary sense of that word.75
If these criteria are defined broadly enough, much art, literature, and even
some musicand dance will be included. This is, of course, Sunstein's goal, for
he wants to map our received understandings concerning the kinds of
expression that enjoy maximal protection. On the other hand, he does not want
to define his categories too broadly. After all, commercials often comment on
the human condition and social norms in order to sell products. As Sunstein
notes, "it is plausible to think that almost all speech is political in the sense
that it relates in some way to the existing social and political structure."
7 6
Nevertheless, he concludes that even "if some people understand the speech
in question to be political, it cannot follow that the speech qualifies as such for
constitutional purposes, without treating almost all speech as political and
70. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION 71-74 (1957).
71. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, supra note 65. at 263. ("1 believe. as a teacher. that the people
do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems, 'because they will be called upon to vote."').
Meiklejohn would surely have agreed that art is also necessary to engage in political participation and
political debate (as in his famous example of the town meeting), so his use of the word "vote" must be
understood in an extended, metaphorical sense.
72. SUNSrEIN, supra note 1, at 130 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id. at 130-31.
74. Id. at 131.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 132.
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thereby destroying the whole point of the two-tier system., 77 Unfortunately,
this does not so much resolve the difficulty as restate it.
Indeed, the breadth of Sunstein's definition threatens to undermine the
reasons he gives for the central role of political speech. Here it is useful to
contrast Meiklejohn's and Sunstein's approaches. As we have seen, Meiklejohn
argued that art and literature deserved protection because citizens needed them
in order to vote and discuss politics. His concern is tightly linked to the actual
processes of self-governance, and that is precisely why his claims about the
importance of Beethoven and Bo Diddley to debates about tariff regulation
seem strained. Sunstein, on the other hand, believes that art and literature help
individuals deliberate about social norms generally, whether or not they have
anything to do with government action or inaction. He avoids Meiklejohn's
problem by not requiring a direct and significant relationship between protected
speech and government processes. Nevertheless, he justifies special protection
of political speech on the grounds of government's greater incentives for self-
interested action. When government regulates political speech it "is most likely
to be biased or to be acting on the basis of illegitimate, venal, or partial
considerations. ''7 Moreover, "[g]overnment is rightly distrusted when it is
regulating speech that might harm its own interests; and when the speech at
issue is political, its own interests are almost always at stake."79
One can surely question this premise. If we are looking for the situations
in which governments are the most venal, biased, and partial, it might well be
in the budgetary process when they hand out tax deductions, pork-barrel
projects, and other government entitlements. However, even if we grant
Sunstein's premise that greater dangers of venality and self-dealing are reasons
for the special protection of political speech, it is hardly clear that Dostoevsky
or Dolly Parton deserves this additional protection. Indeed, Sunstein says as
much: He acknowledges the "worry that moralistic people or religious groups
will attempt to use the arm of the state in order to censor speech that threatens
their particular, partial conception of the good."' Nevertheless, "these kinds
of threats, though real, do not distinguish regulation of speech from regulation
of anything else; hence they provide us with no special reason to be suspicious
of government regulation of speech.' In other words, the distrust/self-
dealing rationale argues for a much narrower definition of specially protected
political speech than Sunstein himself provides. Sunstein argues that "[i]f
courts are not especially suspicious of government regulation generally, they
should not be especially suspicious of government regulation of nonpolitical
77. Id.
78. Id. at 134.
79. Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 135.
81. Id.
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speech. ' 2 However, this is also true of much of the speech that Sunstein
defines as "political"-for it includes any speech that has something to say
about social norms.
Even so, Sunstein is not about to deny constitutional protection to art,
music, and literature, for he has epicycles ready to hand. Government may also
not regulate speech in the second tier because it disagrees with the message or
because the message gives offense. 3 Nevertheless, as Sunstein notes, offense
is a "complex and underanalyzed category,"84 and his theory begs the
interesting question whether objections to pornography and racist speech fall
into this category. Sunstein suggests that "[ilt is at least plausible to think that
the victim of a racial epithet suffers something other than mere offense.""
This requires him to introduce further epicycles on the theme of what is merely
offensive and what is otherwise regulable, on what is offensive but also
political, and on what is both offensive and political but can nevertheless be
relegated to certain times and locations. 6 Through sufficient bobbing and
weaving in the various chapters of this book, Sunstein is able to achieve his
goal, which is that "a Madisonian approach would not require major changes
in current law.,
87
Yet the problem has never been that a process-based theorist like Sunstein
could not add enough competing considerations to his theory to map existing
doctrinal results. The problem is rather the artificiality of the means used.
Once again it is interesting to compare Meiklejohn and Sunstein in this respect.
What makes Meiklejohn's solution problematic is not that one cannot claim
that art, music, and literature help produce a citizenry better prepared for
democratic deliberation. It is rather that we think this a highly idiosyncratic
and impoverished perspective on the value of art, music, and literature.
Similarly, Sunstein claims that art, music, and literature gain maximal
protection not for their positive attributes but because they are likely to be the
targets of opportunistic politicians and blue-nosed civil servants. For
Meiklejohn, art is protected because it serves politics; for Sunstein art is
protected because it is continually threatened by politicians. In both cases, the
constitutional value of art is a reflection of its relation to politics-either as its
aid or its enemy, either as its servant or its victim, either as an instrument of
its realization or as its familiar and recurrent prey.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 155.
84. Id. at 155-56.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 156-65.
87. Id. at 159. A major exception is that libels against public figures that do not involve matters of
public concern would not be subject to the actual malice rule of New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S.
254 (1964). SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 159-62. Here again Sunstein applies a narrow conception of the
idea of what is "political" that is in serious tension with the broader articulation elsewhere in the book. See
text accompanying notes 74-79.
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The difficulty is that the reasons why we value something are often as
important as the fact that we value it. If I praise the Mona Lisa because it
makes a good doorstop, I surely value it, but my valuation has a certain
inherent bias. If the Mona Lisa is splashed with paint or even disfigured, it still
makes a perfectly good doorstop, and so my decisions about how best to
protect it will be affected accordingly. Moreover, our reasons for valuing
something have more subtle ideological effects. For example, they determine
the central and peripheral cases of the category. To return to the previous
example, the central case of valuable art is the big, bulky (but not too bulky)
item that keeps my door in place. By contrast, a blues number by Muddy
Waters hardly seems worth much fuss. It is a peripheral example of a category
that fails to exemplify the reasons for the category's value.
Sunstein emphasizes, quite correctly, that the reasons why we value
something constitutionally are not necessarily the same reasons why we value
it generally.88 But this begs the question whether they should be different in
any particular case. Even if institutional considerations require that the reasons
for constitutional protection of art and literature differ in some respects from
the reasons we believe that these things are valuable to us, it by no means
follows that constitutional reasons must be limited to the protection of the
political process. If a process-protection rationale severely distorts the reasons
why we think art, music, and literature are valuable, this is a good reason for
a less monistic theory of free speech justification.
If we constitutionally value art as the servant or victim of politics, we risk
skewing our estimation of it. It becomes art not for art's sake, but for
policy's.89 It is art as seen through the eyes of a policy wonk. It is art either
in the service of politics, or as the favorite target of politics. From this
perspective, the central case of artistic expression becomes not George
Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue, but George Carlin's "seven dirty words"
monologue.
90
We often associate arguments that art has nonpolitical worth with the elite
values of high culture. Yet there is more to art than elite art, and there is more
to culture than high culture. The critique of Meiklejohn's political
instrumentalism must be more than a defense of the aesthetic values of elites
88. As Sunstein puts it, "constitutional value" is not the same as "social value." SUNSTEIN, supra note
1, at 153.
89. Sunstein himself does little to assuage one's fears on this score. Stressing the value of high culture
to democratic deliberation, he notes that Dickens' Bleak House "contains a great deal of comment on the
fate of poor people under conditions of industrial profit-seeking." Id. He then adds, with apparent
seriousness, that Joyce's Ulysses "deals with the role of religion in society," id., a claim that is surely true
but which rather tends to demonstrate the limitations of the argument. At some point, of course, it becomes
difficult to draw the line between earnestness and parody. Thus, in like fashion we might think of Camus'
The Plague as an anguished cry for universal health care coverage, Shakespeare's King Lear as an attack
on term limits, and Euripides' Medea as a comment on the breakdown of the Ancient Greek family.
90. A work of art that now lives on-in ironic symbolism--as a mere appendix to a judicial opinion.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (appendix to Court's opinion).
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against the philistinism of politics. Attacking the two-tier system in the name
of high culture co-opts the critique of Meiklejohn; it becomes an argument for
one set of elite values against another. Moreover, it is a co-optation with its
own ideological effects. First, it produces a tendency to justify the protection
of popular culture in terms of the aesthetic values of high culture. It leads to
the claim that we must defend the right to broadcast Married With Children
so that we can preserve the right to display Robert Mapplethorpe's
photography. Yet when popular and elite standards diverge (as they often do),
such arguments become increasingly strained. Second, and more important, this
very kind of argument demeans the values and modes of popular culture,
because it views popular values merely as corrupted approximations of elite
values, worthy only to the extent that they imperfectly reflect a purer aesthetic.
Understood in its broadest terms, the critique of political instrumentalism
is not simply a claim of art for art's sake. Rather it is an argument about the
kind of culture we live in and the importance of respecting its expressive
values whether or not they converge with elite preoccupations. A theory of free
speech is also a theory of democratic culture, and from a populist perspective,
democratic culture is popular culture. America has become a democracy not
merely because it has adopted more democratic forms of governance, but
because its culture and its social norms have become more democratic and
popular. Such a culture is more than a servant of some ideal of democratic
deliberation. But it is also more than a poor reflection of elite culture, valued
merely because of its debauched relationship to it. The First Amendment does
not protect mass culture for the sake of avant-gardism and high art; rather it
protects the latter because they are part of a larger phenomenon-the carnival
of public discourse and popular culture that arises in a democratized society.
The First Amendment is about Spielberg as much as Bergman, about the
Jackson Five as much as Jackson Pollock, about Rambo as much as Rimbaud.
Meiklejohn and his intellectual progeny have always shared this dual failing:
Defending art in the name of politics and all art in the name of high art, they
inevitably neglect the cultural and condescend towards the popular.
VI. THE TWO-TIER SYSTEM AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM
The most important difficulty with Sunstein's two-tier system, however,
is that it is in serious tension with his egalitarian, good-government agenda. At
first glance, the two seem to mesh quite nicely. Placing speech on matters of
public concern in the upper tier appears to safeguard the processes of
democratic deliberation. Placing everything else in the lower tier allows him
to regulate commercial advertising and sexually explicit speech in the interests
of promoting democratic seriousness and gender equality.
The problem is that the two areas Sunstein most wishes to reform are
campaign finance and broadcast policy. He wants to permit legislatures and
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administrative agencies to regulate these areas in the public interest, and he
wants courts to exercise greater judicial restraint in passing on the
constitutionality of such regulations. However, part of what he wants to
regulate in broadcast policy, and all of what he wants to regulate in the area
of campaign finance, is political speech-the speech that is at the very core of
his theoretical framework and that calls for the highest level of judicial
protection.
Here Sunstein's arguments for the two-tier system come back to haunt
him. He distinguishes nonpolitical expression (including nonpolitical art and
literature) from political speech on the grounds that the dangers of self-dealing
by politicians are greatest in the case of speech about public affairs. But if this
is so, it suggests that reform of campaign finance and broadcast policy should
be viewed not with greater judicial restraint, but with the strictest of scrutiny.
Sunstein himself recognizes that campaign finance reform may serve as a
device for the protection of incumbency.' Moreover, as Scot Powe has
shown convincingly, FCC regulation of the broadcast media over the past
century has involved continual favoritism towards political allies and continual
hostility towards political opponents or those thought to be politically
embarrassing.92 Sunstein's worries about self-dealing in the area of political
speech, it would seem, are abundantly justified. If so, his assumption that
governments aided by appropriate expertise can be trusted to develop policies
that are in the public interest must be viewed with more than a grain of salt.
The problem is that Sunstein wants two things at the same time: He seeks
judicial restraint in situations where legislatures and administrative agencies
engage in reform-minded attempts to promote serious and balanced discussion
of public issues-for it is the appropriately managed conduct of core political
activity that makes democracy function properly under his theoretical system.
On the other hand, his defense of political speech as standing at the core of
First Amendment protection is premised on the very real concern that the
dangers and consequences of self-interested dealing by the political branches
are most serious precisely when such speech is the subject of regulation.
This dilemma reveals the essentially schizophrenic nature of the book: The
two-tier system so elaborately developed in the second half of the book does
nothing for Sunstein when applied to the first half's discussion of campaign
finance, and indeed is a positive hindrance. This may explain why the two-tier
system is not fully introduced until Chapter Five, when questions of campaign
finance and broadcast policy are safely out of the way.93
91. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 99.
92. LUCAS A. POWE., JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 108-61 (1987);
see also KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 8, at 103-74.
93. Note that one cannot escape this dilemma by invoking the realist point that campaign finance and
broadcast policy reforms are no more regulations of speech than the status quo. The realist critique (which
I describe in more detail shortly) does not hold that regulations of speech are not regulations; it argues that
speech is continually undergoing regulation by the state, even in situations where we least expect it. Ono
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The only way out of the dilemma is to argue that regulations of political
speech should be treated with greater deference because and to the extent that
they promote rather than debilitate democratic values. In Meiklejohn's
language, such regulations may be restrictions on the liberty to speak, but not
of the freedom of speech.9 However, this answer does not escape the
dilemma but simply embraces one of its two horns. It shows that Sunstein's
theory, at bottom, is a theory of reduced judicial scrutiny in the regulation of
political speech-an ironic result for a Meiklejohnian theory. In practical
terms, he must abandon the argument for greater distrust of government
regulation in the areas of campaign finance and broadcast regulation.
The reason is simple. In the abstract, one can say that distrust is
unnecessary when the government improves democracy and promotes
democratic deliberation. But in practical terms, courts must still pass on
challenges to reform efforts that claim to have these goals. The long-term
consequences of such reforms will rarely be clear on their face. Even where
there is relative certainty, there will be many disputes about what kinds of
results are better or worse for democracy (including disputes about what
"democracy" really requires). Moreover, different interest groups often have
very different visions of what effective campaign finance reform would look
like. For example, in the bills placed before Congress at the end of the 1994
session, the Democrat-sponsored bills looked markedly different and regulated
different things than the Republican-sponsored bills.95
Because legislatures will usually insist that they are acting to promote
democracy, courts must face the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny.
The question is what degree of confidence should be reposed in the product
that emerges from the legislative process-whether from a Congress dominated
by incumbent Democrats or one (as after the 1994 elections) dominated by
incumbent Republicans.
Ultimately, if we wish legislatures to reform the political process and
courts to uphold these reforms, we must be prepared to accept and even
advocate greater judicial restraint in these cases. This means that courts must
allow a number of different regimes to pass constitutional muster, even if some
of them do not in fact promote democratic goals in the long run. The only way
to avoid this result would be for the judiciary to arrogate for itself the task of
drafting the perfect legislation, from which no deviations would be held
still has to justify the regulations in place, whether they are due to lcgislative and administrative action or
to common law rules of property, tort, and contract.
94. MEiKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 21.
95. As one observer has noted, because Republicans generally have access to wealthy individual
donors, they want no limit on what candidates can raise and spend but are willing to abolish or limit
political action committees; Democrats, in contrast, generally want to restrict the total amount spent and
oppose abolishing or limiting political action committees unless they are nationally prominent. See David
E. Rosenbaum, The 1994 Campaign; Campaign Finance: G.O.P. Filibuster Defeats Campaign Finance
Curbs. N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 1, 1994. at Al.
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constitutional. This, however, is a task for which courts are no better suited
than legislatures, and that is no more likely to result in a healthier political
process.
Sunstein is not ultimately wrong, I think, in advocating greater judicial
restraint in review of campaign finance regulations (I shall have more to say
about broadcast policy in the next section). Once we move from a strictly
libertarian conception of free speech and adopt a more regulatory model of the
political process (as both Sunstein and I do), the boundaries that determine
permissible limitations on financing of political campaigns necessarily become
fuzzier. Constitutionality begins to turn not so much on simple on/off rules (for
example, Buckley v. Valeo's infamous distinction between limitations on
contributions and expenditures 96), but becomes a matter of reasonable
legislative judgment within certain boundaries.
Nevertheless, I think that support for such legislation requires a necessary
qualification, which I am not sure is consistent with Sunstein's generally
progressivist model of free speech but is rather more populist in flavor. In my
view, any constitutional system of campaign finance reform must be combined
with term limits. Because the temptations towards incumbent protection
legislation are so great, any campaign finance reform that an existing Congress
legislates must be accompanied by guarantees of continual rotations in office.
From a progressivist standpoint, term limits are problematic because they
debilitate the expertise of legislative bodies; experienced legislators must leave
after fixed periods of time and there is a corresponding loss of institutional
memory. Term limits regularly place the government in the hands of neophytes
rather than experienced and knowledgeable policymakers. A progressivist
might support term limits for familiar "good government" reasons of
preventing corruption, but even here it would be unclear whether such a
prophylactic measure was the most appropriate means to this end. From a
populist perspective, however, term limits are not merely a remedy for
corruption. They also serve as an important symbol that the government, no
matter how noble its asserted motives, does not always act in the best interests
of its citizens, and that individuals who are long in power naturally tend to
lose touch with their constituents and abuse their privileges.
Like campaign finance reform, term limits pose First Amendment problems
(in addition to problems under the Qualifications Clause). It might seem
strange to think that the problems of the former regulation of speech could be
solved by even greater regulation; perhaps the best analogy is to the theory of
"second best" in economics.' The greatest practical difficulty is that our
system of constitutional adjudication makes it difficult for courts to pass on a
96. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
97. Indeed, Fred Schauer has suggested that the entire structure of First Amendment law can be
thought of this way. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1
(1989).
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unified system of electoral regulation that would include both features.
Nevertheless, from a populist perspective, it seems entirely plausible that the
constitutionality of one must depend in part on the presence of the other.
VII. A NEW DEAL FOR SPEECH AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PREFERENCES
Apart from the two-tier system, Sunstein's other basic conceptual move is
an attack on uncomplicated notions of government neutrality towards speech.
Sunstein's analysis here is quite similar to arguments I have previously
offered,98 and for obvious reasons, I think it is quite convincing. What I have
called a "Legal Realist" approach to the First Amendment he calls a "New
Deal" for free speech.99 The relationship between these titles is apt, for
realism was an intellectual tool in the promotion of the New Deal agenda.
However, as I shall argue, Sunstein goes well beyond the realist point that
government is responsible for unjust distributions of communicative power. He
argues that government is also responsible for the public's tastes in broadcast
programming; hence the government has the duty to shape private preferences
to promote the ideals of democratic deliberation. This additional claim gives
his argument a distinctly progressivist spin.
The basic insight of the realist analysis is simple: Government is always
involved in the regulation of speech, even and especially through its common
law rules of property, tort, and contract. These rules affect the ownership and
distribution of communicative technology; they also affect the economic power
of people who might wish to purchase the right to use them. Effective
communication is always a function of the existing social and technological
structure. In our age, this increasingly requires access to media of mass
communication, which in turn is tied to rights of private property. At the same
time, because the right to speak is tied to property rights, the rules of contract,
property, and tort give private individuals power to withhold the right to use
communicative technologies from each other or to impose economic or other
social sanctions on the exercise of speech. For example, property owners can
invoke the right of trespass to keep away protesters, advertisers can withdraw
financial support from broadcasters whose programs they dislike, networks can
refuse to sell air time to organizations they do not wish to associate with, and
political activists can organize economic boycotts of organizations with
disagreeable views. A system of private rights simultaneously puts in place a
98. See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 20.
99. SuNsmi, supra note I. at 28-38. Chapters Two and Three offer a revised version of his
discussion in THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION. which in turn derives from a 1992 article. Free Speech Now,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992), which introduces the terminology of a New Deal for free speech. The
importance'of the New Deal and the rejection of pre-New Deal understandings are recurring themes in
Sunstein's work. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L REv. 421
(1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUJM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
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system of rights to free speech based on property ownership and a system of
private censorship based on the exercise of these rights."0
As long as the practical ability to communicate with others is effectively
tied to inequalities in the ownership of property, we cannot say that a purely
formal right to speak is identical with a substantive liberty or with equal
opportunity to speak. The government may not defend the current allocation
of contract, property, and tort rights merely on the grounds that its system of
private property is neutral as between speakers and does not interfere with
speech. Under a different regime of rules, different individuals would have
greater economic power and hence different substantive abilities to speak and
to deter others from speaking. Put in Sunstein's favored terminology, there is
no natural baseline for the distribution of these rights and therefore no natural
distribution of rights and powers to purchase and use communicative
technology.'' Because the government is always regulating speech in one
way or another, the distribution of rights that affect speech is a matter of
public policy, and the government is responsible if its distribution has the
effect of inhibiting speech or disserving valuable goals like democratic
deliberation.'02
This analysis softens the distinctions between positive and negative
liberties, between government intervention and government inaction, and
between public and private power. For example, we can think of certain
features of free speech law-for example, the existence of public fora-either
as constitutionally mandated rights of speaker access to government property
or as government subsidies of speech. Similarly, we can view constitutional
restrictions on libel judgments as redistributive decisions to subsidize speakers
at the expense of the persons whose reputations they besmirch and whose
reputational capital they lessen.'03
Nevertheless, the point of this conceptual exercise is not to abolish the
distinctions between concepts like public and private power. The goal rather
is to understand these boundaries as more flexible. Indeed, we may even think
of public and private as conclusory terms that help us describe the kinds of
regulatory schemes that best further interests like human liberty, cultural
development, the pursuit of truth, and democratic self-government. It is
tempting to rush to the conclusion that in a post-New Deal world we will no
longer have use for concepts like government neutrality. Yet it is a fool's
100. See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 20, at 411; J.M. Balkin, The American
System of Censorship and Free Expression, in PATrERNS OF CENSORSHIP AROUND THE WORLD 155 (Ilan
Peleg ed., 1993).
101. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 34-46; Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 20, at
409-14. The language of baselines is a recurrent trope in Sunstein's work. For the best example, see
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 99.
102. SUNSTEiN, supra note 1, at 177-79; Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 20, at
413-14.
103. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 47; Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 20, at 403--04.
1968 [Vol. 104: 1935
Populism and Progressivism
errand to think that we can abandon the distinction between public and private,
between positive and negative liberty, or between government action and
inaction. Whenever we attempt to cast these distinctions aside, they simply
return in other forms. They are what I have called in other contexts "nested
oppositions"; conceptual opposites whose intellectual coherence depends in an
uncanny way on the existence of their opposite numbers.0
At bottom, the legal realist analysis is a form of conceptual liberation. It
allows us to think about free speech policies differently and helps us remove
certain intellectual blinders. Yet by itself it has no necessary political
consequences. One might accept this analysis and still conclude that, all things
considered, it is best to retain the present system or even move to a more
libertarian one because this furthers the goals of free speech as well as any,
despite its obvious defects.'0 5 In Sunstein's case (as in mine) the point of this
reconceptualization is to reconcile our commitment to free speech with our
commitment to egalitarianism. It is designed to show that more egalitarian
policies towards free speech are compatible with the free speech tradition. The
major difference between us concerns the kind of egalitarianism each of us
hopes to further. For Sunstein, equality serves the goal of promoting a healthy
system of democratic deliberation. For me the goal is to ensure equality of
opportunity for self-expression and equality of access to the political
process.'
In offering this reconceptualization, both Sunstein and I owe an intellectual
debt to an unlikely pair--Owen Fiss and the Critical Legal Studies movement.
In two important essays in the 1980's, Fiss emphasized the importance of the
state as a positive force in constructing a democratic system of free expression
and criticized the conflation of freedom of speech with the existing regime of
property rights.'07 Critical Legal Studies scholars, in turn, refurbished the
104. See J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990).
105. In that case, however, the choice does not rest on spurious notions of government neutrlity or
inaction, but on a sober consideration of the administrative limits of government's ability to shape the
distribution of economic and communicative power. Note that when we take these administrative limitations
into account, something like the concept of neutrality reemerges. If the government cannot effectively
produce any system of free speech rights (because it would be administratively impractical or would be
enormously expensive) the government's responsibility for not achieving such systems is lessened to that
extent. Because ought implies can, governments cannot be held responsible for failure to produce systems
they cannot realistically create. However, this is not quite the same thing as an equation of government
inaction with government neutrality. When the government cannot achieve particular goals through
regulation, it should choose instead among the best of the realistically available alternatives, and it is still
responsible for this choice.
106. These contrasting visions correspond very roughly to progressive and populist defenses of First
Amendment egalitarianism. From a progressive standpoint, First Amendment egalitarianism is informed by
the goals of managerialism; equality promotes the creation of a desirable form of and climate for public
deliberation. From a populist standpoint, First Amendment egalitarianism is driven by an aspiration for
equality of opportunity; it is motivated by a desire for "the little guy" to be free from concentrations of
government and corporate power. It is important to stress that these goals do not necessarily conflict in
many contexts; that is one reason why I find much of what Sunstein has to say appealing.
107. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOwA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Owen M. Fss,
Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987). Nor should we forget the earlier contributions of Jerome
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realist critique of the distinction between public and private power, and
attacked the neutrality of baselines established by the common law.'
Although my intellectual debt to CLS is clear, its influence on Sunstein's
constitutional theory may be less obvious but is no less significant. Both The
Partial Constitution and the present book would have been impossible without
the critique of neutrality promulgated by figures like Morton Horwitz and
Duncan Kennedy in the 1970's.109 It is of course Sunstein's particular genius
that he has been able to adapt insights from many different sources, including
CLS and feminism, and synthesize them together into a more or less coherent
vision of constitutional law and regulatory policy. Such a gift may be viewed
from the perspective of the left and the right as domestication,"'0 "mere"
bricolage,"' or conceptual confusion." 2 Yet these weaknesses (if they are
such) are also strengths, for by cobbling together disparate sources, Sunstein
has been able to fuse different theoretical perspectives into the service of an
enlightened political centrism and in a language that is distinctively his own.
Sunstein's New Deal for speech goes beyond the realist critique, however,
in its views about the scope and extent of government responsibility. Sunstein
hopes to use the critique of government neutrality to justify his civic
republican view that government both can and should instill civic virtue and
attention to public issues in its citizens. This leads him to two controversial
positions: First, he believes the realist critique shows that law is responsible
for the lack of quality in public discourse in the United States and the
programming preferences of the public. Second, he believes that legal
regulation of the mass media can foster public-spiritedness and the goals of
democratic deliberation.
The realist critique of neutrality-at least in the form I have offered
it-holds merely that different regulatory regimes will have different
consequences on the distribution of income and power. Therefore the
government must be held responsible for the distribution of economic power
and the relative access to communicative technology that goes with it. Sunstein
takes this point one step further. He argues that different regimes will produce
Barron and Thomas Emerson. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA.
L. REV. 795 (1981).
108. MORTON HORwrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 (1992); Daniel R.
Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1091 (1993)
(reviewing HORwrI7, supra); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages in the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
109. Indeed, the critique of neutrality gives The Partial Constitution its title, for Sunstein's claim is
that we have a Constitution not only partial in its coverage but also partial in the sense of its lack of
neutrality.
110. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt To Mainstream Radical
Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 123, 125 (1992).
111. Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1071, 1071 (1993) (book review).
112. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991).
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not only different economic holdings, but also different preferences, and in
particular preferences for information about politics and for what Sunstein calls
"high-quality" programming.1
3
To a certain extent this is surely true. Because different regimes will
produce different distributional consequences, they will surely result in changes
in revealed preferences-that is, preferences as judged by what people do in
markets. If the legal regime makes me poorer, I may not buy that new Lexus,
but will settle instead for a used Corolla. It is not clear, however, that I
wouldn't still prefer the Lexus if I had the money. Different regimes create
different options for individuals, and hence change the ways in which they can
exercise their wills. In addition, by changing holdings, we also change the
relative quantity of various goods and services produced in the market, and this
will also have an effect on revealed preferences.
Finally, large changes in distributions of property over several generations
might produce marked changes in preferences because of the relationship
between tastes and socioeconomic class. If a person is raised in a rich
household, her preferences may be different than if she were raised in poverty.
Thus, if we want people to grow up liking ballet, we could increase the
chances of this by making their grandparents very wealthy.
Sunstein, however, is not making these relatively modest claims about
law's effects on preference formation. For he believes that tastes as well as
options are significantly affected by the choice of legal regimes. In particular
he believes that law is largely responsible for the low quality of public
discourse in the United States and for people's failure to expose themselves to
the issues of the day. It is an article of civic republican faith that preferences
are endogenous to politics; hence, Sunstein argues, if people fail to watch
sufficient amounts of high-quality programming or expose themselves to public
issues, this is due to some form of regulatory failure.
Surveying the quality of public discourse in the United States, Sunstein
finds little to admire. 4 The airwaves are full of "scandals, sensationalized
anecdotes, and gossip," 5 and the broadcast media "deals rarely with serious
issues and then almost never in depth."116 Yet, Sunstein argues, "if anything
like this is true, it is, I believe, the law-not nature, not 'freedom,' and not
'private decisions'-that is responsible."'" 7
Sunstein argues that "[i]t is the law that creates the system operated by the
broadcasting ... [and] print media." s8 Hence it is the law that gives rise to
113. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 90. The important ambiguity in Sunstem's use of this expression is
explored in the discussion of Sunstein's critique of popular culture at infra text accompanying notes
154-68.
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the choices individuals make, which, in turn, feed back and reinforce the kinds
of programming that the media offer. If law caused the problem in the first
place, Sunstein assumes, it can surely remedy it. Accordingly, Sunstein holds
that "there is no good basis for supposing that current tastes and habits are
rigidly fixed.".. 9 Indeed, he contends, "[t]here is reason to believe that
viewing habits, like many other customs and cultural practices, are extremely
vulnerable to large-scale shifts on the basis of relatively mild government
interventions."'1
20
What would explain law's ability to produce these large-scale shifts? One
possibility suggested by Sunstein is that viewer tastes are due to fads. Thus,
"[s]ometimes the practice of many people is dependent on what other people
do. Once some people change their practices, a wide range of others change
as well."'121 For example, if a few people start watching Frasier rather than
Roseanne, this signals to others that perhaps there is something worth watching
on the other channel, and hence a snowball effect occurs making Frasier the
current darling of television audiences. This is a useful model to account for
certain types of cultural fads, but it is unclear that it can explain mass
preferences for Roseanne versus The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour. Once we
consider the choice between sitcoms and public-affairs programming, it is by
no means clear that mass preferences for what Sunstein considers low-quality
programming or mere entertainment are due to fads. Rather, they seem to be
longer-term phenomena that are comparatively resistant to changes in fashion.
Sitcoms come and sitcoms go among the most popular programs on television,
and still The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour is nowhere to be found.
22
Another possibility is that tastes for mass entertainment reflect what Jon
Elster calls "adaptive preferences."' 3 Building on Leon Festinger's theory
of cognitive dissonance and Paul Veyne's historical sociology, Elster argues
that people sometimes form preferences for what they can reasonably expect
to have given the limitations of their situation and reasonably feasible
alternatives.' 24 Changes in taste reduce cognitive dissonance because people
then do not have to want what they cannot have, nor do they have to find
intolerable circumstances they cannot escape."2 This theory would suggest
that people now prefer low-quality programming because they have given up
119. Id. at 90.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. By contrast, 60 Minutes, with its combination of aggressive investigative journalism leavened by
sentimental human interest stories, was for many years one of the highest-rated programs on television, and
has spawned many (for some, too many) imitators.
123. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 110 (1983)
[hereinafter ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES]; JON ELSTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 54 (1993).
124. ELSTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 123, at 110-11, 115-16; LEON ETNOEnR, A
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); PAUL VEYNE, BREAD AND CIRCUSES (Brian Pearce trans.,
Penguin Press 1990) (1976).
125. ELSTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 123, at 54.
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hoping for higher-quality material. Thus, law might create large-scale shifts in
viewer preferences by providing high-quality alternatives to existing
programming.
So stated, it should be obvious that the theory of adaptive preferences is
particularly ill-suited to explain why people continue to watch sitcoms or The
Price Is Right when they could be watching C-SPAN or MacNeil/Lehrer.
Adaptive preferences occur when people are denied alternatives and limited in
their choices. However, one need not engage in dissonance reduction strategies
to avoid being disappointed in one's desire for public-affairs programming.
One can see The MacNeillLehrer NewsHour every Monday through Friday.
This is to say nothing of the considerable amount of public-affairs
programming presently available on television, in addition to historical
documentaries, science programs, and "high culture" entertainment like theater,
opera, and ballet.'26 To be sure, some of this programming is on cable
television, but this would mean at most that we would see adaptive preferences
for "trash television" only among those members of the public who cannot
afford cable. Moreover, much of this programming is on public television,
which is available to the vast majority of Americans.' 2 7 If Americans are not
watching public-affairs programming, it is not because no such programming
is available.'2
There is an important intuition behind the adaptive preferences claim, but
it does not suggest that modest changes in broadcast policy will do the trick.
One might argue that people prefer entertainment to public-affairs
programming because they work hard all day earning a living and have limited
leisure time, or because they have been reduced to grinding poverty and need
entertainment as a form of escape. If so, we might change their preferences for
public-affairs programming by giving people higher incomes and more
satisfying lives. Sunstein suggests that public-affairs programming and public
television in general seem to be viewed disproportionately by more affluent
and educated viewers,' 29 and it is often said that public television subsidizes
the rich at the expense of the poor and the more educated at the expense of the
less educated. 30 However, this suggests that we might change the public's
tastes for such programming by eliminating poverty and reforming our
decaying educational system. These reforms would be much more costly than
simply requiring different broadcast fare, and they would probably do more
good as well. On the other hand, it is unlikely that modest changes in
126. For example, on most basic cable systems one can currently watch. in addition to local and
national news, PBS and C-SPANI and 2, CNN and CNN Headline News. Court TV. the Discovery
Channel, the Learning Channel, Arts & Entertainment, and Bravo.
127. KRATIENMAKER & POWE, supra note 8, at 302, 314.
128. Id. at 82-83, 298-300.
129. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 91.
130. But cf. KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 8. at 313-14 (citing studies that indicate that well-
educated people watch basically what everyone else watches).
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broadcast policy would have much effect because they do not address the
deeper economic and social problems that poor and working people face.
What is most puzzling about Sunstein's arguments about the malleability
of preferences is that they seem belied by his diagnosis of their causes. He
acknowledges that people's preferences may be due to their economic and
educational status, and yet he advocates creating large-scale shifts in these
preferences through FCC regulation rather than welfare and educational policy.
Law may have a role in creating the economic and social conditions that lead
to current viewing tastes, but it does not follow that these preferences are
easily manipulated by changing broadcast policy as opposed to changing the
underlying social and economic structure. Indeed, one is tempted to borrow a
line from Elster and Festinger and suggest that Sunstein's views on preference
shaping are themselves an example of cognitive dissonance reduction, in this
case, wishful thinking. As Elster explains, sometimes people believe things
because they prefer a world in which they are true to one in which they are
false.
13 1
Although Sunstein's views about the mutability of viewer preferences seem
unpersuasive, his more central point is that the legal system should regulate the
media to promote democratic deliberation and viewer interest in public affairs.
According to Sunstein, broadcast policy, like other free speech policies, should
be tailored to serve the goal of promoting deliberative democracy. In particular,
Sunstein attacks the idea that viewer choice, or what he calls "consumer
sovereignty," should control. Thus, there is some irony in Sunstein's invocation
of the statement in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC that "[i]t is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."'132 For Sunstein, this apparently refers not to the actual
preferences of viewers, but rather to an idealized conception of what their
preferences as citizens should be under appropriate conditions.
Sunstein is particularly concerned that existing broadcast fare lacks
sufficient diversity and sufficient attention to public affairs. He is of course
aware of the natural rejoinder that the amount of diversity and public
discussion has never been higher, given the rise of cable television, CNN, C-
SPAN, Court TV, and talk radio. Sunstein responds that only half of U.S.
households are currently wired for cable, and "[e]ven worse, the households
and the children that are probably most in need of high-quality programming
are least able to afford it.' 33 Yet the obvious response to this problem would
be for the government to subsidize cable television in every American home,
and then simply allow viewers (and parents supervising children) to choose
what they want to watch.
131. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 123, at 148-49.
132. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
133. SUNSTEIN, supra note I, at 68.
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However, Sunstein finds this capitulation to existing choices and
preferences particularly troubling. He argues that information about public
affairs is a public good, and hence that "[f]reedom of choice will therefore fail
to capture the important external and systemic benefits of learning about public
issues."' 34 People will simply not watch enough C-SPAN even if we give it
to them for free (or at greatly reduced cost) as long as they are subjected to
the enticements of Roseanne or MTV.
Of course, the existence of public goods is usually a justification for
government regulation, and for forcing people to make choices they would not
otherwise make. For example, in the environmental area we issue regulatory
mandates to people to take precautions we would not expect them to take of
their own accord. If we really believe that exposure to public affairs is a public
good every bit as important as a clean environment, should we not consider
forcing viewers to read newspapers or watch "high-quality" programming in
order to ensure the "external and systemic benefits of learning about public
issues"?1 35 In some contexts, the idea is not all that far-fetched. We do
require children to attend school until the age of sixteen. We attempt,
sometimes with only limited success, to ensure that the general population is
literate and able to participate in public affairs as well as able to earn a living
in the contemporary marketplace. The question Sunstein's analysis raises is
whether further mandates should be issued to fully grown adults who, for one
reason or another, have an insufficiently well-developed taste for discussions
of serious public issues.
Sunstein quite naturally and properly recoils from the claim that we should
force people to watch public-affairs programst 6 However, neither does he
want to accept the principle of "consumer sovereignty" in television watching.
Indeed, allowing the public to watch what it wants gauged by its revealed
viewing preferences is the opposite of sovereignty for him. While he concedes
that "[p]eople's consumption patterns in television-watching do suggest a more
favorable attitude toward existing practices" '37 than he finds desirable, these
revealed preferences cannot be regarded as more authentic or true than the
preferences people have as democratic citizens.' Sunstein argues that
"private broadcasting selections are a product of preferences that are partly a
result of the existing broadcasting system and not entirely independent of
it."' 39 So one cannot without circularity assume that existing preferences
justify the current system of broadcasting.T"
134. Id. at 69.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id. at73.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 73-74.
140. Id. at 74.
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These arguments shed further light on why Sunstein is uncomfortable with
autonomy-based accounts of the free speech principle. Because individual
preferences are the result of the existing legal system, what people choose to
say, read, watch, or listen to may simply be the result of the system in which
they live.' 41 Their choices both as speakers and listeners may be due to
poverty, insufficient education, or lack of education, and hence need not be
fully respected. 42 By contrast, he argues, when the people act as citizens
through their democratic representatives, they engage in democratic sovereignty
that is superior to consumer sovereignty and deserves greater deference:
"People might well choose to view a silly situation comedy at night, while also
enthusiastically supporting a requirement of media attention to public
affairs.'14 If so, "[t]heir support of that requirement," Sunstein argues,
"operating through democratic channels, could reflect a reasoned judgment
about what they value for the polity of which they are a part, not a
consumption choice about what they want for their private enjoyment. That
judgment should be respected."' 44
Sunstein's separation of consumer choice from democratic choice seems
puzzling. First, the same individuals whose cognitive abilities Sunstein has
criticized as consumers are suddenly praised for their perspicacity as citizens.
If poverty, insufficient information, and lack of education cause people to
choose badly in their choice of programs, don't they also affect their
judgments as citizens about what legislation to support? If so, why should
these judgments be any more entitled to respect? Conversely, if their political
judgments are entitled to respect, why do we need to second-guess their
choices about what to watch or listen to?
This conceptual difficulty is yet another version of the problem we saw
earlier in the discussion of Sunstein's two-tier system: Sunstein distrusts the
current system of democratic deliberation, thinking it undermines democracy
and badly needs reform; yet he trusts the same system to produce legislation
in the public interest, and holds that its judgments in this regard "should be
respected." Yet one can apply Sunstein's argument about the circularity of
respect for consumer sovereignty to his optimistic assessment of political
sovereignty: We can also say that political judgments about broadcast reform
"are a product of preferences that are partly a result of the existing
broadcasting system and not entirely independent of it.' 45 If the existing
political process produces legislative reforms, these cannot without circularity
be considered to be the result of democratic sovereignty because what appears
141. Id. at 137, 143-44.
142. Id. at 143-44.
143. Id. at 73.
144. Id.
145. Id at 73-74.
1976 [Vol. 104: 1935
Populism and Progressivism
to be the people's political choice may simply have been due to defects in the
process and lack of information and education among the citizenry.
Second, Sunstein fudges the point that regulatory choices will be made not
by citizens themselves, but by their elected representatives. In fact, they will
most likely be made by government bureaucrats with no direct accountability
to the people. Of course, this suggests how one might reconcile his relative
disrespect for the public as consumers and his relative respect for the public
as citizens. This difference in attitude reflects the difference between individual
choices and choices filtered through a representative system aided by
regulatory expertise. Yet it is precisely at this point that a potential distinction
between progressive and populist orientations emerges. From a progressive
standpoint, the substitution of representative judgment for individual judgment
is highly desirable; once the people's representatives have decided that some
form of broadcast regulation is appropriate, they can pass the question along
to regulatory experts who can fashion the best means of promoting democratic
goals. From a populist standpoint, this substitution is considerably more
troublesome and even suspicious. The idea that government bureaucrats will
select what people should or should not watch under the name of serving their
interests seems like a net loss of sovereignty rather than a net gain.
By the time Sunstein has finished his critique of consumer sovereignty, he
seems poised to call for highly interventionist mandates to improve the quality
of broadcast programming and ensure that the unwashed masses watch these
programs. But in fact he does nothing of the sort. The reforms he proposes are
comparatively modest and, for the most part, eminently sensible. First,
Sunstein argues that we should devote more money to public broadcasting,
especially children's programming. 46 Second, the FCC and other government
agencies might publicly fund or produce more "high-quality" programming"'
along the lines of the BBC. Third, Congress might relax the antitrust laws so
that broadcasters could develop codes of conduct designed to lessen advertising
pressures that affect programming.'48 Fourth, the government might place a
tax on advertising revenues to fund public broadcasting or publicly subsidized
programming. 149 (Another related possibility would be to charge license fees
from broadcasters for the same purpose.' ) Finally, Sunstein suggests that
the government might guarantee free air time to political candidates, either by
directly purchasing it, or by making such provision a condition of a broadcast
license. 5'
146. Id. at 84.
147. Id at 88.
148. Id. at 86.
149. Id.
150. See Henry Geller, Mass Communications Policy: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going.
in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 290, 308-09 (Judith Lichtenbcrg ed., 1990).
151. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 85.
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Although these reforms are for the most part plausible suggestions, it is
unclear that they will have anything more than a modest effect in promoting
democratic deliberation. People will still be free to watch MTV rather than
"high-quality" programming. Nor is there any indication that these suggestions
will produce large-scale shifts in viewer preferences. Better children's
television may have salutary effects on democratic deliberation, but that is only
in the long run. Free air time to political candidates is an excellent way of
reducing the inherent disparities between wealthier and poorer candidates, for
television advertising often eats up increasingly large portions of modem
campaigns.'52 Yet Sunstein does not advocate restricting the purchase of
political advertising, and he gives us no reason to assume that negative
campaigning and attack ads will not continue.
VIII. THE CRITIQUE OF MASS CULTURE
What is most interesting about Sunstein's reforms, in fact, is not so much
their specific contenit as the striking contrast between their relative modesty
and the strong distrust of consumer choice and viewer preferences expressed
in this book. Sunstein's theoretical bark is much worse than his practical bite.
One reason for this discrepancy is that Sunstein is not only a gifted
theoretician but also a person of impeccably sound judgment. He is
temperamentally (one might even say constitutionally) incapable of being
unreasonable for very long. He is therefore unwilling to carry any of the
principles he espouses to their logical, if potentially absurd, conclusions.
Moreover, the fact that he is unwilling to do this should be understood less as
a sign of his lack of consistency than of pragmatic good sense triumphing over
academic excess.
Nevertheless, Sunstein's saber rattling against the evils of consumer
sovereignty reveals something much deeper and, I think, more important about
his general views concerning the First Amendment. It reveals the cultural
underside of his "Madisonian" conception. Sunstein's attack on consumer
sovereignty reflects his distrust of and disappointment with American mass
culture and the popular tastes reflected in that culture. Underlying Sunstein's
discussion of broadcast policy is a division between high and low
culture-with the former seen as essential to the repair of the system of
democratic deliberation and the latter identified with mass culture and
particularly with the culture of television.
This pejorative view of mass culture is implicit in Sunstein's repeated call
for more "high-quality" programming,153 a term that is importantly and
152. See, e.g., Glenn F. Bunting & Dwight Morris, Huffington Outspends Feinstein 3 to I on
Television Ads, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at A3 (discussing importance of television expenditures in 1994
California Senate campaign, the most expensive Senate race in American history).
153. StUNSrIN, supra note 1, at 82, 84-85, 88-91.
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systematically ambiguous. It appears to refer both to programs that deal with
public issues and programs that appeal to the norms of "high culture"-for
example, "serious" drama (as opposed to made-for-TV movies) and BBC-style
documentaries." Conversely, what it most decidedly does not refer to are
the hallmarks of television mass culture-situation comedies, tabloid
journalism, Beverly Hills 90210, MTV-in short, all that is generally referred
to as "trash television," regardless of its high technical quality or considerable
production cost.
The systematic conflation of public-affairs programming with programming
appealing to the mores of "high culture" under the rubric of "high-quality"
programming is central to the cultural mindset of this book. Sunstein's
conception of "high-quality" is naturally opposed to the existing tastes and
preferences of the masses. This is clear in Sunstein's dismissal of current
viewer preferences as due to limited opportunities and lack of education.1 5'
Moreover, as Sunstein points out, it is not accidental that "high-quality"
programming is disproportionately watched by the well educated.'"
Finally, and most important, Sunstein's conception involves an opposition
between high culture and low culture in which the virtues of democratic
deliberation are associated with the former and opposed to the latter. The mass
audience, seduced by the temptations of the culture of television, is diverted
away from high cultural "public-affairs programming" necessary to the health
of democracy. Thus, we see the following set of conceptual oppositions: High-
quality programming is to low-quality programming as democratic deliberation
is to consumer sovereignty, as high culture is to popular culture, and as
enlightened preferences are to popular preferences. Sunstein's worry about the
decline of public discourse parallels his worry about the rise of mass culture;
unchecked and uncontrolled, mass culture may become the enemy of
democratic deliberation and "Madisonian" values.
Nevertheless, it would be completely wrong to conclude from this that
Sunstein is intolerant of popular culture. Indeed, precisely the opposite is true.
Sunstein views popular culture precisely as an object of toleration, as a thing
that must be tolerated even though it is of relatively little political value,
endured even though it distracts people from the business of government. It is
precisely this attitude of toleration that allows him to view popular culture as
peripheral to democratic culture rather than central to it, as a vulgar sideshow
rather than the main event, as an intermittent nuisance that occasionally
interferes with the processes of democratic deliberation but that is generally
irrelevant to it. Popular culture is something people turn to when they are not
engaged in serious discussions about public issues. It is a diversion from
154. It also refers to programming that provides appropriate educational values for children. See id.
at 84-85.
155. 1d. at 19-21.
156. Id. at 91.
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democratic deliberation, and dangerous precisely because it is so diverting. At
the same time, because popular culture occasionally does interfere with
democratic deliberation, it must be opposed and counteracted, shaped and
managed in order to produce the conditions for true democracy.
Sunstein's dissatisfaction with popular preferences and his distrust of
popular culture lead naturally to the charge that he is elitist.'57 But this
revelation should hardly seem shocking or surprising once we recognize
Sunstein as the intellectual heir of good-government progressivism. The
pre-World War I progressives were elitists too; they were sure in their
convictions that expertise could improve the processes of government and that
rational discussion would lead to an enlightened consensus that would promote
social progress in the interests of all." 8 Their faith in elite judgment
distinguished them from the previous generation of populist reformers.
There are in fact deep and abiding connections between progressivism and
elitism. Progressivism sets for itself the tasks of setting the government's house
in order and improving the culture of democracy. It views itself as working in
the interest of a public good discernable through educated and enlightened
reason. As such, progressivism is the natural home for intellectual elites, who
(like everyone else) tend to measure the world by their own standards.
Conversely (and unsurprisingly), intellectual elites are valued doubly by
progressivism: first because they possess the necessary information and
expertise to formulate wise public policy, but second because they are viewed
by other progressives as the best educated and most committed to the values
of rational inquiry and deliberation. Thus, progressivism inevitably recasts the
norms of democratic deliberation in the image of elite values and elite
preoccupations, and inevitably judges the quality of popular participation by
elite standards of education and taste. Popular culture, with its shallowness,
rudeness, and lack of intellectual seriousness, is almost always seen as a fall
away from these standards. Hence bettering or counteracting that cultural
deficit in the interests of democracy inevitably becomes part of the progressive
agenda.
Conversely, because progressivism places such faith in the formation of
consensus through good-faith cooperation and rational inquiry, it has difficulty
acknowledging that some problems-in particular problems of race, nationality,
and class-"may be rooted in values and interests whose differences cannot
rationally be bridged even with the best of intentions."'5 9 When such
consensus fails to form, or when it forms contrary to elite understandings,
progressivism naturally tends to identify the causes as parochial self-interest
and uneducated passion. As a result, progressivism is always destined to see
157. Id. at 90-92 (discussing charges of elitism).
158. Rabban, supra note 28, at 11-14.
159. Id. at 14.
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itself as the perpetual victim of ingratitude for all of its pains by a populace
that continually fails to recognize progressivism's reasoned efforts on its
behalf.
From this standpoint, civic republicanism is merely the latest episode in
the progressive crusade to improve American democracy in the face of the
woeful political culture the American public has created. Scot Powe has
remarked that Sunstein's broadcasting policy demonstrates that he does not
want better programming, but "better people."' 6 Sunstein, I think, would not
necessarily disagree. The whole point of the "Madisonian" system is to
improve democracy not by kowtowing to popular preferences but by opposing
and reshaping them. Sunstein's political theory is unabashedly perfectionist,
both for the political regime and for the people who live in it. If perfecting
democracy requires people to match their viewing habits to those better
educated, then this is the appropriate model for them to aspire to. If Woodrow
Wilson hoped to make the world safe for democracy, Sunstein hopes to make
the American citizenry safe for democracy as well.
For these reasons, the bare accusation that Sunstein is elitist does not
further the discussion very much. Sunstein is hardly unaware that he will be
accused of elitism. The real question is whether, in his words, he is being
"unacceptably elitist."' 61 Moreover, he offers what I think is an entirely
logical response to such criticisms: It is perfectly justifiable to be an elitist if
your values really are the better ones. And Sunstein has no doubt that the
preferences of the affluent and well educated are objectively better If such
people will "disproportionately enjoy high-quality broadcasting," it is
"precisely because they have been educated to do so." '' 62 "[H]igh-quality
education," Sunstein argues, "is not something to be disparaged. It has a
point.' 163 Moreover, people who lack these better preferences need to be
educated so that they will come to have them; the mass media should be part
of a comprehensive system of public education designed to serve these
ends.' 6 Sunstein concludes that "[m]any people who are not college
graduates should benefit a great deal from" high-quality broadcasting. 6
"Indeed, they may receive disproportionately high benefits." 166
160. Conversation with Scot Powe, Professor of Law and Government. University of Texas. in Austin.
Tex. (Dec. 15, 1993).
161. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1. at 91.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id After this uggestion, Sunstein adds the perfunctory disclaimer that -there is notlung elitst
about that." Id. But of course, the idea that the masses should be educated to conform to the preferences
of elites because they are better preferences is the very essence of elitism. The question is whether it is
unacceptably or improperly elitist to educate people so that they have better preferences, and Sunstein's
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Moreover, it will do no good to respond to these claims by trotting out
familiar assertions about the subjectivity of all values and preferences. Sunstein
is quite prepared to defend the view that some preferences are better than
others. The only question is which ones really are better. But of course, that
is precisely the sort of discussion he would like to invite. He wants us to ask
ourselves what values citizens should have and whether it is not the duty of
the state to instill those values so as to make better citizens. I think he is right
to ask these questions.
IX. THE PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM
The deeper difficulties in Sunstein's position can only be addressed once
we recognize that Sunstein's critique of mass culture and viewer preferences
is really a form of ideological critique. Sunstein claims that citizens' values
and preferences are distorted. This distortion is due either to lack of
information, heuristic biases caused by social position, attempts to reduce
cognitive dissonance, or mistaken conceptions of true interest. 67 These
claims are quite consistent with a familiar conception of ideology-distortions
in beliefs or preferences that cause individuals to act contrary to their
interests.
6 8
This conception of ideology turns crucially on the notion of beliefs and
actions that deviate from an objective interest-for example, the class interest
of an oppressed group such as the urban proletariat. This objective interest
exists apart from the private and subjective interests of members of the
oppressed group. Indeed, short-term and parochial interests of individual
members of the proletariat may cause them to fail to recognize their common
interest as class members. Therefore, in some versions of Marxist theory, it is
necessary for a revolutionary vanguard to instill the appropriate revolutionary
consciousness in the members of the class. 69 Sunstein's civic republicanism
also assumes that citizens have an objective interest-an interest in democratic
deliberation and democratic government-that exists apart from their private
167. Jon Elster's work makes clear the connections between traditional conceptions of ideology and
claims about the distortion of preferences. In fact, Elster argues that one can explain most ideological
phenomena through social psychological mechanisms that distort either beliefs or preferences. See JON
ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 18-22,465-68,476-93 (1985); ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 123,
at 141-66.
168. See MICHILE BARRET, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: FROM MARX TO FOUCAULT 4 (1991)
(identifying classical conception of ideology as mystification that serves interests of some class). Beliefs
can serve the interests of one's own class, or they can serve the interests of another class. The notion that
one's beliefs are serving interests contrary to one's own is often summed up in the illusive term "false
consciousness," a term, interestingly, that Marx himself never used. Id. at 5.
169. See, e.g., Vladmir I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, in LENIN ANTHOLOGY 50 (Robert C. Tucker
ed., 1975).
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interests as citizens, and it is the duty of government and law to instill them
with appropriate preferences so that they will pursue this objective interest. t0
All ideological analysis involves an analyst who offers a critique and an
analysand who is the object of criticism. Here Sunstein plays the role of the
analyst critiquing the preferences of ordinary citizens. The basic problem for
all ideological analysis is that it is reflexive: The analyst identifies defects in
the analysand's thought due to her interest and social position, yet the analyst
herself is also subject to cognitive deficiencies and cognitive biases due to her
own interest and social position.'7' These defects and biases may color her
understandings about whether and to what degree the analysand's thought is
inadequate or distorted. Hence, the position of the analyst and analysand is
symmetrical, or to put it another way, every analyst can be an analysand to
someone else.
Successful ideological analysis must also put the analyst's own ways of
thinking into question. This requirement follows because we must assume that
the thought of all human beings is partly adequate and partly inadequate to the
understanding of social conditions, and that each person's way of looking at
the world partly grasps what is just even if it partly furthers injustice. No
person has a complete monopoly on truth, but none has a complete monopoly
on falsehood either. If so, the analyst may not explain all disagreements
between herself and the analysand as due solely to the analysand's defective
beliefs, preferences, and structures of thought. She must consider the
possibility that her own analysis of the situation is due to the limitations and
partiality inherent in her own thought.
To this end, the analyst must consider what truths might be contained in
the analysand's way of looking at the world. She need not accept the
analysand's perspective completely and uncritically, but she must entertain the
possibility that the truth is partly, even if only slightly, on the analysand's side
and that the analysand has something to teach her about social conditions
generally, or, at the very least, the social conditions that the analysand faces.
If the analyst does not do this, she cannot tell whether her pejorative judgment
about the analysand's thought is due to limitations in the analysand's thought
or to limitations in her own. 7 '
170. The common public interest in democratic deliberation, in turn, allows them to pursue and define
their common interests as citizens. One should distinguish the public interest in democratic deliberation
from the specific content of what kinds of policies are in the public interest. The latter are not defined prior
to deliberation in Sunstein's system, but grow out of the process of democratic deliberation.
171. This problem, first clearly identified by Karl Mannheim. leads to the predicament called
"Mannheim's Paradox": Ideological analysis is always produced by a subject who in turn is subject to the
same ideological scrutiny she performs on others. KARL MANNHEIM. IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 76-77 (Louis
Wirth & Edward Shils trans., new ed. 1991) (1936). The phrase "Mannheim's Paradox" was coined by
Clifford Geertz. See CLIFFORD GEERW4 Ideology as a Cultural Sysrem. in TiE INTRPRETATION OF
CULTURES 193, 194 (1973).
172. We might compare this requirement of ideological analysis to the requirement of understanding
a text we disagree with. As Gadamer points out, if we do not attempt to understand a text's claims to truth.
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Through the process of understanding why the analysand thinks as she
does, the analyst can begin to see (albeit always to a limited extent) how her
own situation affects her understanding of social conditions and questions of
justice. Thus, the analyst must use the analysand's thought as a partial check
upon her own. 73 There is no guarantee that this process will be foolproof,
and it contains many risks of its own. t74 Nevertheless, it is a more mature
form of analysis than a unidirectional model that does not inquire into the
analyst's status and locates all distortion in the thought of the analysand. The
unidirectional approach assumes that if we disagree with an Other it is because
we have something to teach her; it does not consider the possibility that the
Other may also have something to teach us.
The deeper problem with Sunstein's critique of popular preferences and
mass culture is not that it is elitist, but that it is unidirectional. It locates the
source of difference in the mind of the Other, and it explains this discrepancy
in terms of cognitive defects, narrow self-interest, and vulgar self-gratification.
In so doing, it fails to consider the possibility that the progressive academic
might possess a limited vision, a narrowness of mind, or a parochial
sensibility. The unidirectional approach allows defects and passions to be
projected from the mind of the analyst onto the hapless object of her
objections.
Because Sunstein's critique of consumer sovereignty is, at bottom, a form
of ideological analysis, he too must take on the burden of self-reflexive
inquiry. He must consider what features of his own situation-as a legal and
political theorist who earns a living writing and teaching about constitutional
law and public policy issues in a university setting-potentially skew his
understanding. He must try to use popular culture as a partial check on his
own position.'
A nonreflexive approach to ideology sees ordinary citizens as suffering
from a pathology, a defect that needs to be cured through the analyst's
expertise. The relationship between the academic and the citizenry is that of
a wise doctor diagnosing a sick patient. By contrast, a reflexive approach
understands the relationship between the analyst and analysand as a
disagreement about what is good, a disagreement that may be due to
we will not know whether we disagree with it because the text lacks coherence or because we have not
really understood it. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 261-63 (Garrett Barden & John
Cumming trans., Crossroad Paperback 1982) (2d ed. 1965).
173. More generally, we must rely on other people for help in ideological analysis. Sometimes this
help comes in the form of disagreement with and criticism from others.
174. On some of these risks, see Balkin, supra note 22, at 159-66.
175. Since I am also engaged in ideological critique, the same injunction applies to me as well.
Sunstein and I share a considerable amount in common in terms of background and current social
position-for example, we are both white, middle-class, straight, Jewish law professors who attended
Harvard Law School in the late 1970's and currently teach at elite institutions. Of course, this does not
excuse me from the attempt to see why Sunstein's defense of elite values has some merit. Nevertheless,
precisely because of the similarity in our backgrounds, he does not have to try very hard to convince me.
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misunderstandings and ideological blinders on both sides. The first sees the
analysand as an object of rectification, while the second sees the analysand as
a subject engaged in a virtual dialogue with the analyst, who demands that the
analyst try to see things from her point of view. The first is an attempt merely
to bring enlightenment to others; the second is an attempt to bring
enlightenment to one's self.
Unfortunately, Sunstein attempts to sidestep these issues by asserting that
"Madisonian goals are not mere preferences."' 76 Because they are not mere
preferences, they are not subject to attack as merely Sunstein's personal desires
for a good society. Nor can they be said to be the result of lack of education
and cognitive deficiency. But this resolves the matter too quickly. Sunstein is
surely right that a demand for justice or democracy is not a mere preference.
Yet it does not follow that an analyst's concrete articulation of what justice or
democracy requires is beyond ideological scrutiny. Our view of what these
ideals require in particular cases may be due in part to the limitations and
situation of our own thought. Hence, even if all persons express fealty to
justice or democratic self-government, our own particular interpretation of what
justice and democracy require may be partly the result of our own situation
and interests. Although justice and democracy are not "mere preferences," we
cannot avoid ideological scrutiny of our interpretations of these norms by
claiming that they are democracy and justice simpliciter.
I think, in fact, that there are important connections between the kind of
ideological analysis I advocate here and the ideals of dialogue normally
venerated in dialogic and deliberative political theories. What these theories
honor in theory, the reflexive approach tries to honor in practice. Thus, my
criticism of Sunstein is not that he is wrong to value deliberation and dialogue,
but that he does not do sufficient justice to his own dialogic commitments. In
his encounter with popular culture, he should not be in the position of a policy
expert dictating to the masses the content of their appropriate preferences.
Rather, he, and I, and all constitutional theorists, should be engaged with
popular will and popular culture, open to the possibility that the varied
perspectives of ordinary citizens might influence our views just as we hope to
influence theirs.
X. POLITICO-CENTRISM VERSUS POPULIST ALTERNATION
In particular, an encounter with popular culture might tend to counteract
the tendency, common to certain academics, politicos, and even a few self-
styled revolutionaries, to overstress the importance of politics to the life of
ordinary citizens. We might even coin a new word to describe this
phenomenon: Let us call it politico-centrism. If ethnocentrism is the world seen
176. SUNSTEIN, supra note I, at 91.
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through the eyes of a cultural chauvinist, politico-centrism is the world seen
through the eyes of a political junkie.
What makes it difficult to understand politico-centrism as an ideological
position--especially for teachers of law and political theory-is that politics,
broadly defined, is central to the human condition, for we do and must live in
a world with other people. Politico-centrism merely fails to grasp that specific
articulations of the value and importance of politics are parochial, and leave
out significant portions of the complicated world of human activity and human
values. Politico-centrism is like the famous cartoon depiction of the New
Yorker's view of the world, where the cosmos appears to shrink drastically
west of the Hudson River; it resembles the confusion of the genuine
importance of New York with the particular importance given to it by the New
Yorker.
It is hardly surprising that persons who deal with law and politics every
day might come to believe that public affairs have or should have a
disproportionate importance to every person's thoughts and activities. The
lifestyles of legal and political theorists in the academy are particularly suited
to produce this sort ofjudgment. Academics have comparatively large amounts
of leisure time (which I define as time they need not devote to the minimum
requirements of their jobs). Moreover, they tend to spend the time they do
have thinking, writing, and discussing books and ideas, many of which include
public issues.
Most ordinary citizens, by contrast, do not have the same leisure to pursue
in depth the relative benefits of managed care versus single-payer health plans.
They may be interested in politics, but they are also interested in eking out a
living wage and taking care of their children. For example, viewed from the
perspective of the many American women who work outside the home and yet
still have primary responsibility for childcare, devotion to public affairs must
take a back seat to the harsher realities of life. For them a "Madisonian"
system, which insists that all citizens devote "broad and deep attention to
public issues,"'177 must seem the sort of pipe dream invented by people who
do not have to work for a living.
78
Unfortunately, Sunstein gives little more than lip service to these concerns.
"No political regime," he explains, "can or should insist that citizens be
177. Id. at 20-21.
178. In its classical conception, civic republicanism also demanded considerable devotion to political
affairs from the class of citizens who were heads of households. Yet these citizens possessed leisure time
precisely because they were supported by an army of women, servants, and artisans. See Hendrik Hartog,
Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 75 (1987); Linda R. Kerber, Making
Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE LJ. 1663, 1668-71 (1988). Sunstein offers us a kinder, gentler, civic
republicanism that retains its public spiritedness while jettisoning its inegalitarian features. Yet the question
remains whether this political theory can be divorced from the political economy that originally supported
it. In terms of access to leisure time, the similarities between the otherwise dissimilar classical head of
household and the contemporary academic are particularly striking and may tend to explain academic belief
in the feasibility of the republican conception of civic duty.
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thinking about politics all, most, or even much of the time; people have many
other things to do."' 79 Yet he continues by suggesting that lack of interest
is often a result of cognitive defect and ideological delusion.'8t Sunstein well
recognizes that people's socioeconomic status and situation in life may
contribute to what he regards as insufficient concern with current policy
debates. However, he does not view their situation as producing a perspective
with its own claims to validity, but rather as the source of cognitive disability
and false belief. "We know enough," Sunstein explains, "to know that lack of
interest is often a result of inadequate education, perceived powerlessness,
unsatisfactory alternatives, or a belief that things cannot really be
changed."' 8' Even so, one must also inquire into the status of "We" who
knows these things about the great unwashed.
Similarly, Sunstein acknowledges that "[blusy people cannot be expected
or required to devote all or most of their time to public issues."'"
(Presumably the slackers have no such excuse.) "One of the advantages of a
representative system-not to mention one with a large bureaucracy-is that
it allows the citizenry to devote its attention to subjects other than
politics.' 1 3 But the very way of framing the issue begs the question. It
implies that people might be allowed to divert attention from their primary
concern-which is politics-to secondary concerns (like raising children) and
the pursuit of mere preferences (like eating). It does not sufficiently engage
with the possibility that politics might simply and justifiably play only a very
small part in many people's lives.
Indeed, a subject largely left undiscussed in the book is exactly how much
effort people would have to make for Sunstein's vision of democracy to be
realized. Sunstein insists that "it is hardly unrealistic to assess a system of free
expression by examining whether it generates broad and deep attention to
public issues, and whether it brings about public exposure to an appropriate
diversity of view. These are not utopian goals. ' 'I s4 But of course that is
precisely the question-is "deep attention" to public issues by all citizens a
utopian goal and can government "bring[] about" their "exposure to an
appropriate diversity of view" in ways that do not violate their liberties or are
not unduly paternalistic? The discrepancy between the ideal and the real is a
recurring problem for Sunstein's project because he seems to want a very high
degree of public involvement and familiarity with current affairs without
forcing anyone to watch or read anything against her will.
179. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 21.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Complicated issues like health care or trade policy may demand
considerable information and attention to detail to be discussed intelligently
and effectively. This poses a considerable difficulty. If Sunstein really wants
the vast majority of adult Americans to be well acquainted with the available
policy options and the relevant pros and cons, he will better approach an ideal
of democratic deliberation, but his theory looks increasingly unrealistic, and
his goals, in his own words, "utopian." On the other hand, if all he is saying
is that people should know in a rough sort of way the kinds of issues currently
before the Congress, such a goal might be attainable, but under Sunstein's own
criteria it hardly constitutes a well-functioning democratic system.
One escapes this dilemma if one sees the legislature and not the people as
the true arena of democratic deliberation. The legislature would do the sort of
in-depth analysis necessary to choose wise policy, while the citizenry would
simply point in a very broad way the direction they wished to travel. Some of
Sunstein's prior work suggests this division of labor, and it is consistent with
his Madisonian predilection for limited democracy, as opposed to limited
government. 185 Yet Sunstein makes clear in this book that he expects the
citizenry as well as the legislature to be well informed. After all, if citizens are
not engaged in informed democratic deliberation, they will tend to send the
wrong signals and elect the wrong individuals to the legislature.
Sunstein is surely not wrong to hope that the citizenry can become better
informed about public issues; government can and should take steps to give
ordinary people better opportunities to learn about public affairs and become
involved in public life. Many of Sunstein's suggested reforms (as opposed to
his rhetoric) should be unobjectionable from a populist standpoint. Yet
populism also demands recognition that citizens may have good reasons to
neglect politics. This inattention may reflect the comparative urgency of the
demands of everyday life, or a belief that government adequately albeit
imperfectly serves their interests. However, it may also reflect the growing
judgment that government is the seat of corruption, privilege, cronyism, and
injustice. At some point, this indignation will surface in popular political
action, and when it occurs, it must be given its due. From a populist
perspective, an alternation between periods of relative inattention and episodes
of popular uprising is not a pathological but a normal feature of democratic
life. It symbolizes the people's simultaneous recognition that they ultimately
rule and that their government is usually in the hands of people who
systematically forget this fact. The model of populist democracy is not
prolonged dialogue but periodic revolution.
186
185. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
186. One can find this idea in the words of the Declaration of Independence itself: "Governments arc
instituted ... [to secure the people's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and] whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government .... THE DECLARArION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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This alternation between inattention and outrage looks quite different and
very disturbing from the perspective of progressivism. Citizen activism is
supposed to be continuous and sustained rather than concentrated in brief
moments of outrage, just as sustained rational deliberation is to be preferred
to sporadic outbursts and expostulations. Some progressives may seek
revolutionary changes in society, but in its preference for sustained democratic
deliberation, progressivism is decidedly antirevolutionary.
Faced with recurrent political apathy, progressivism has traditionally
decried civic sloth and preached the gospel of public participation. Yet
precisely at those moments when the citizenry is most eager and engaged,
progressives are rarely pleased with the results. An energized populace is,
unfortunately, empowered by popular sentiment and popular passion.
Progressivism tends to be suspicious of such energy, thinking it usually badly
informed and misdirected by clever manipulation." Thus progressivism
finds itself continually hoping for an active citizenry, but perpetually in fear
that it will get what it wishes for.
We have seen this schizophrenia before. It is the simultaneous trust of the
democratic process in the abstract coupled with a distrust of the same process
when goaded and controlled by ordinary citizens. Populism's vision of normal
politics is progressivism's nightmare-a citizenry that sporadically takes power
into its own hands without adequate preparation and sufficient education in
proper values. Yet from populism's standpoint the progressive dream is hardly
heavenly-for it is premised on disdain and disrespect for popular will and
civic energy. It is a participation with only idealized participants, a democratic
culture without a demos.
XI. CONCLUSION
Populism, like politics, makes strange bedfellows. I have argued that the
importance of populism rests not only in its distinctive conception of
democracy, but in its lessons about the social construction of judgments-the
sort of critique often associated with postmodern philosophy. It may seem
strange to connect populism and postmodemism, that most arcane of academic
There is an interesting analogy between this conception of populism as involving a sort of "punctuated
equilibrium" and Bruce Ackerman's idea of a division between normal politics and constitutional politics.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 133-40. 230-65 (1991). The companrson is not
exact, for these moments of popular uprising are not all moments of constitutional change. Rather, many
(if not most) of them occur during what Ackerman would call "normal politics." Nor can all of these
uprisings be classified as "failed constitutional moments." Nevertheless. Ackerman's theory recognizes, as
mine does, the importance of the interaction between popular and elite discourse in American democracy.
Recently Ackerman has come to emphasize this uncertain and intermittent relationship as a key mechanism
in his theory of "dualist democracy." See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Consatut:onal?.
108 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1995).
187. PARKER, supra note 23, at 82-93 (discussing distrust of popular energy by legal academy and
other intellectual elites).
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perspectives. But this incongruity is more apparent than real. A populist
constitutionalism demands that academics become more self-conscious about
their status as members of a subculture whose elite values tend to shape and
occasionally distort their perspectives. It asks that they become more aware
about the culturally bound nature of the activity called constitutional theory.
It entreats them to consider the possible value in popular culture. Finally, it
requires them to acknowledge that distinctions between a more valuable high
culture and a less valuable low culture have become increasingly problematic
in our age. All of these are familiar postmodemist themes.)"8 The fact that
I might turn to postmodernism to articulate them is simply further evidence of
the particular place from which I stand and the particular cultural tools
available to me given this position.
Constitutional theorists have something to learn from populism, even if at
the end of the day they must cast a skeptical eye on its excesses. Yet this
encounter may help theorists recognize the excesses of positions that seem
most natural to them. Just as critical race theory and feminism ask whites and
males to recognize and surrender their privileges as whites and males, so too
populism asks elites to recognize and surrender their privileges as members of
these distinctive subcultures. In particular, populism requires professors of
constitutional law to forgo their privileges as academics. For those of us who
are trained to respect the meritocratic values of the academy, this may be no
small task, and our resistance to it should not be underestimated. In any case,
the goal of a populist constitutionalism is neither anti-intellectualism nor
academic self-loathing. It is rather a richer and fuller understanding of the self
and its place in the larger political community. All critical theory seeks
enlightenment, and enlightenment, like charity, begins at home, with an
examination of the self and its precommitments. Through this process all of us
may hope to understand better what our commitment to democracy-rule by
the people-truly means.
188. On postmodern views of culture, see STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY (1989). The Sheryl Crow song that begins this essay
is symbolic of the merger of high and low culture. Crow based the lyrics of her song on a poem by
Bennington College Professor Wyn Cooper, taken from a book of poetry that originally sold less than 500
copies. Crow added a chorus and then set the piece to music, transforming a work of "high culture" into
an object of popular consumption. Ajay Sagal, The Poet and the Rock Star, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994,
Magazine Section, at 39.
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